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HALLECK'S INJUSTICE TO GRANT.

SOME days ago, when conversing with the Editor of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW about the correspondence between General Halleck and my father, General Grant, just after the fall of Fort Donelson, and about the strange condition of some of that correspondence in the records published by the War Department, I was requested to put it together in consecutive order, giving all the dispatches and correspondence relating to the relieving of General Grant from his command after the fall of Donelson, with my comments upon the same. I submit the following, as extracted from my father's documents:

On the 16th of February, 1862, General Grant telegraphs General Halleck *via* Smithland:

"We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores."

And on the same day he wrote to Brigadier-general Geo. W. Cullum, Halleck's chief of staff, a detailed report of the siege and capture of Donelson. Nothing is sent by Halleck to Grant during the 16th or 17th, but on the 18th Halleck orders:

"Don't let gunboats go higher up * than Clarksville. . . ."

* Meaning the Cumberland River.

And on the 19th, Halleck telegraphs General Hunter in Kansas:

"To you more than to any other man out of this department are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson."

And to McClellan:

"Brigadier-general Charles F. Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory and the whole country will applaud."

There was on the 19th an order issued from Halleck's headquarters, by his adjutant-general, congratulating Flag-officer Foote, Brigadier-general Grant, and the brave officers and men under their commands, on the recent brilliant victories on the Tennessee and Cumberland.

Grant reports through Cullum on the 19th:

"Clarksville is evacuated, and I shall take possession on Friday next with one division under General Smith. If it is the desire of the general commanding department, I can leave Nashville on Saturday week. . . . Please inform me early of the desire of the general commanding on this point at as early a day as possible. . . ."

On the 20th, Cullum acknowledges Grant's reports and letters from Fort Donelson, and mentions specially the one written on the 19th of February.

The 21st, Grant writes to Cullum:

"I am now in Clarksville, but will move no force there except General Smith's division until I hear from General Halleck. . . . It is my impression that by following up our success Nashville would be an easy conquest, but I only throw this out as a suggestion based simply upon information from people who have no sympathy with us. . . . I am ready for any move the general commanding may order."

News of Grant's being in Clarksville must have gotten to Halleck, for on the same day he telegraphs to Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, and at that time in Louisville, Ky.:

"Advices just received from Clarksville represent that General A. S. Johnston has fallen back on Columbia, and that there is very little preparation for a stand at Nashville. General Grant and Commodore Foote say the road is now open, and are impatient. Can't you come down to the Cumberland and divide the responsibility with me? If so, I will immediately prepare to go ahead. I am tired of waiting for action in Washington. They will not understand the case. It is as plain as daylight to me."

On the 22d, Grant reports to Halleck through Kelton, one of Halleck's staff, a case of pilfering and marauding, and that he (Grant) has placed the commanding officer under arrest and restored the property.

The 23d, Halleck telegraphs to General Sherman instructions to forward to Grant about concentrating 20,000 men at Clarksville. On the 24th, Grant reports that he has returned from Clarksville, and encloses an order he gave to Nelson to take Nashville and report to Buell, and also a dispatch from Buell sent through to Clarksville; and on the 25th, Grant writes to Cullum giving some details, and uses the two following sentences that I deem important points in this correspondence:

"I shall go to Nashville immediately after the arrival of the next mail should there be no orders to prevent it. . . . I am growing anxious to know what the next move is going to be."

The 28th, Grant informs Halleck (through Kelton) of details of his command, and ends his letter in the following words:

"I have informed General Cullum that General Buell ordered General Smith from Clarksville to join him at Nashville. I enclose herewith General Buell's order on the subject. I have just returned from Nashville this morning. My impression is, from all I can learn, that the enemy have fallen back to Decatur or Chattanooga."

March 1st, Grant reports through Kelton, again, that Buell ordered Smith to Nashville.

March 2d, Cullum sends through Sherman the following to Grant:

"General Halleck, February 25, telegraphed me, 'Grant will send no more forces to Clarksville; General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry or a point higher up the Tennessee River. Transports will also be collected at Paducah. Two gunboats in Tennessee River with General Grant. Grant will immediately have such garrisons detailed for Forts Donelson and Henry, and all other forces made ready for the field. From your letter of the 28th I learn you are at Fort Donelson and General Smith at Nashville, from which I infer you would not have received orders.' Halleck's telegram of last night says: 'Who sent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered it across to the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. Send all spare transports up Tennessee to General Grant.' Evidently the general supposes you on the Tennessee. . . ."

Halleck telegraphs the same day (March 2) to McClellan:

" . . . I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville.

His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency."

On the 3d, McClellan answers with the approval of the Secretary of War (Stanton):

"Your dispatch of last evening received. The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way. I appreciate the difficulties you have to encounter, and will be glad to relieve you from trouble as far as possible."

On the 4th, Halleck telegraphs Grant *via* Paducah:

"You will place Major-general C. F. Smith in command of expedition and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and position of your command?"

And to McClellan:

'A rumor has just reached me that since the taking of Fort Donelson General Grant has resumed his former bad habits. If so, it will account for his neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee. I think Smith will restore order and discipline. . . ."

March 5th Grant reports to Halleck:

"Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. Troops will be sent under command of Major-general Smith as directed. . . . I am not aware of ever having disobeyed any orders from head-quarters, certainly never intended such a thing. I have reported almost daily the condition of my command, and reported every position occupied. I have not, however, been able to get returns from all the troops from which to consolidate a return for department head-quarters. All have come in except from General Smith's command at Clarksville. . . . The general has probably been unable to get his, in consequence of being ordered to Nashville by General Buell. General Smith has been relieved by General Buell, and was ordered immediately to the Tennessee by me. As soon as I was notified that General Smith had been ordered to Nashville I reported the fact and sent a copy of Buell's order. My reports have nearly all been made to General Cullum, chief of staff, and it may be that many of them were not thought of sufficient importance to forward more than a telegraphic synopsis of. . . . In conclusion, I will say that you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in every particular to the best of my ability."

The 5th, the same day that Grant wrote the above, Halleck wrote to Grant:

"General McClellan directs that you report to me daily the number and position of the forces under your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to report the strength of your command has created great dissatisfaction and seriously interfered with military plans. Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, is a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return."

On the 6th, Halleck writes to Grant:

"I enclose herewith a copy of a letter * addressed to Judge Davis, President of the Western Investigating Commission. Judge Davis says the writer is a man of integrity and perfectly reliable.

"The want of order and discipline, and the numerous irregularities in your command since the capture of Fort Donelson, are matters of general notoriety, and have attracted the serious attention of the authorities at Washington. Unless these things are immediately corrected, I am directed to relieve you from the command."

The 7th, Grant writes:

"Your dispatch of yesterday just received. I did all I could to get you returns of the strength of my command. Every move I made was reported daily to your chief of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly posted. I have done my very best to obey orders and to carry out the interest of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not wish to impede in any way the success of our arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo to keep you informed of my position, and it is no fault of mine if you have not received my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly intended for the good of the service, and not to gratify any desire of my own.

Believing sincerely that I must have enemies between you and myself who are trying to impair my usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from further duty in the department."

The 8th, Halleck telegraphs McClellan:

"Strange to say I have not yet received any returns whatever from General Grant showing number and position of his forces. I ordered on the 1st of March, one week ago, the movement up the Tennessee to destroy bridges, etc. I can get no official information of how many have gone or where they now are. . . ."

* This was an anonymous letter, and complained of some irregularities at Fort Henry.

And to Grant:

"You are mistaken—there is no enemy between you and me. There is no letter of yours stating the number and position of your command since the capture of Fort Donelson. General McClellan has asked for it repeatedly with reference to ulterior movements, but I could not give him the information. He is out of patience waiting for it. Answer by telegraph in general terms."

Grant answered the above the next day (9th) with two dispatches, one giving detail report of his troops and stating that he had mailed returns three days before, and in the other he says:

"Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. . . . You had a better chance of knowing my strength whilst surrounding Fort Donelson than I had. Troops were reporting daily, by your order, and immediately assigned to brigades. There were no orders received from you until the 28th of February, to make out returns, and I made every effort to get them in as early as possible. . . . I renew my application to be relieved from further duty. Returns have been sent."

Halleck writes to Grant (9th):

'Your letter of the 5th instant, just received, contains the first and only information of your actual forces. If you have reported them before, I have not seen them. General McClellan has repeatedly ordered me to report to him daily the numbers and positions of your forces. This I could not do, and the fault certainly was not mine, for I telegraphed to you time and again for the information, but could get no answer. This certainly indicated a great want of order and system in your command, the blame of which was partially thrown on me, and perhaps justly—as it is the duty of every commander to compel those under him to obey orders and enforce discipline. Don't let such neglect occur again, for it is equally discreditable to you and to me. I really felt ashamed to telegraph back to Washington time and again that I was unable to give the strength of your command. But to business (detailed instructions). . . ."

On the 10th, Halleck telegraphs Grant about reinforcements he is sending up the Tennessee, and ends his dispatch with:

"Arrange for them as they arrive, and be ready yourself to take the general command."

The 11th, Grant says to Halleck:

"Yours of the 6th instant, enclosing an anonymous letter to Hon. David Davis, speaking of frauds committed against government, is just received. I refer you to my orders to suppress marauding as the only reply necessary.

"There is such a disposition to find fault with me, that I again ask to be relieved from further duty until I can be placed right in the estimation of those higher in authority."

On the 13th, Halleck, who has evidently just received the above from Grant, telegraphs him :

"You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good reason for it. I am certain that all which the authorities at Washington ask is that you enforce discipline and punish the disorderly. The power is in your hands—use it, and you will be sustained by all above you. Instead of relieving you, I wish you (as soon as your new army is in the field) to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories."

This was answered on the 14th by Grant as follows :

"After your letter, inclosing copy of an anonymous letter upon which severe censure was based, I felt as though it would be impossible for me to serve longer without a court of inquiry. Your telegram of yesterday, however, places such a different phase upon my position that I will again assume command and give every effort to the success of our cause. Under the worst circumstances I would do the same. . . . P. S.—Since writing the above, yours of the 9th instant is received. I certainly received but one telegraphic dispatch up to the 28th of February to furnish reports of strength. I had done my best, however, previous to that to get in field returns, in order that consolidated returns might be made out to send you. . . ."

March 17th, Halleck, writing to Grant, says :

"I inclose you a letter and a slip from a newspaper as a sample of what I am almost daily receiving in relation to the general plunder of public property which, it is alleged, took place at Fort Donelson. Representations of these robberies by our soldiers, and the general neglect of the officers, were made to Washington, and I have been called on time and again to have the officers and men arrested and punished. Of course I could act only through you, and, as you had full power to order courts, I deemed it your duty to bring these plunderers to justice. Officers of companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions should be held strictly accountable for the conduct of their men, and, when they fail to prevent such misconduct, they should be arrested and tried for neglect of duty.

"In justice to myself as well as to you, I inclose herewith copies of a letter received from the adjutant-general in relation to the matter, and of my answer. . . . I have been directed, hereafter, when any plunder of this kind occurs, to arrest any officer in command of the troops engaged in it."

The following is the letter from the adjutant-general and General Halleck's reply :

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"WASHINGTON, *March* 10, 1862.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, U.S.A.,
"*Commanding Department of the Mississippi, St. Louis.*

"It has been reported that soon after the battle of Fort Donelson, Brigadier general Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President,

the Secretary of War desires you to ascertain and report whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and if so, for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his force; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized, or not, in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and if so, what.

(Signed) "L. THOMAS,
"*Adjutant-General.*"

"HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"ST. LOUIS, *March* 15, 1862.

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. THOMAS,
"*Adjutant-general of the Army, Washington.*

"In accordance with your instructions of the 10th inst., I report that General Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation, that General Grant did this from good intentions and from a desire to subserve the public interest. Not being advised of General Buell's movements, and learning that General Buell had ordered Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant and a part of his general officers, numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of orders issued by General Grant before his departure, and probably under the circumstances were unavoidable. General Grant has made the proper explanations and has been directed to resume his command in the field, as he acted from a praiseworthy, although mistaken, zeal for the public service, in going to Nashville and leaving his command. I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of military subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival, and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied.

(Signed) "H. W. HALLECK,
"*Major-general.*"

March the 21st, in a letter, Grant writes to Halleck the following:

"I have just learned to-day that your dispatches to me after the taking of Fort Donelson reached Fort Henry, some of them at least, but were never sent to me. What has become of the operator then at Fort Henry? I don't know. At present a soldier detailed from the ranks is filling the station."

On the 24th, Grant writes his last letter to Halleck on this subject, and never mentions it again in writing until he writes his

book, which gives what he thinks of Halleck's conduct in his own words. Grant's last letter reads as follows:

"Your letter, inclosing correspondence between yourself and Adjutant-general Thomas, is just received. In regard to the plundering at Fort Donelson, it is very much overestimated by disappointed persons who failed in getting off the trophies they had gathered. My orders at the time show that I did all in my power to prevent marauding. To execute these orders I kept a company on duty searching boats about leaving, and to bring off all captured property found. My great difficulty was with the rush of citizens, particularly the Sanitary Committee, who infested Donelson after its fall. They thought it an exceedingly hard case that patriotic gentlemen like themselves, who had gone to tender their services to the sick and wounded, could not carry off what they pleased. Most of the wounded had reached hospitals before these gentlemen left Cairo. One of these gentlemen (a Doctor Fowler of Springfield) swore vengeance against me for this very act of preventing trophies being carried off. How many more did not the same thing I can't tell.

"My going to Nashville I did regard particularly as going beyond my district. After the fall of Donelson, from information I had, I knew that the way was clear to Clarksville and Nashville. Accordingly I wrote to you, directed to your chief of staff, as was all my correspondence from the time of leaving Fort Henry until I learned you were not hearing from me, that by Friday following the fall of Donelson I should occupy Clarksville and by Saturday week following should be in Nashville, if not prevented by orders from head-quarters of the department. During all this time not one word was received from you, and I accordingly occupied Clarksville on the day indicated, and two days after the time I was to occupy Nashville, General Nelson reported to me with a division of Buell's army, they being all ready on transports; and knowing that Buell's column should have arrived opposite Nashville the day before, and having no use for the troops myself, I ordered them immediately to Nashville. It is perfectly plain to me that designing enemies are the cause of all the publications that appear, and are the means of getting extracts sent to you. It is also a little remarkable that the adjutant-general should learn of my presence in Nashville before it was known in St. Louis, where I reported I was going before starting.

"I do not feel that I have neglected a single duty. My reports to you have averaged at least one a day since leaving Cairo, and there has been scarcely a day that I have not either written or telegraphed to head-quarters. I most fully appreciate your justness, General, in the part you have taken, and you may rely upon me to the utmost of my capacity for carrying out all your orders."

The best comment I can make upon this correspondence, probably, is what I have heard my father say. It is this:

General Halleck unquestionably regarded General C. F. Smith as a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than he (Grant), and, to render Smith available

for such command, desired his promotion to antedate the promotions of the other commanders. It is probable that the general opinion was that Smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. This did not justify, however, the dispatches which General Halleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them when pretending to explain the action of his superiors.

F. D. GRANT.

THE PROGRESS OF TEXAS.

It is a beautiful tradition that, when the Spanish explorers first landed on the shores of Matagorda Bay they were met by the natives with emblems of peace, and that the first word spoken by the chief, as he advanced to meet the holy father who stood under the banner of the cross, was "Tekas," meaning welcome. By easy transition Tekas became Texas, and thus named the province which is now the State. When pronounced in the language of the Cid, Tejas* (Tahas) is soft and musical, and its significance (welcome) is symbolic of the generous hospitality of the people that inhabit the State and form her government; and, surely, no state or nation has a history more resplendent with acts of true hospitality and genuine welcome.

In 1822 a colony of three hundred families came to Texas, under a contract made by Stephen F. Austin, a native of Connecticut, with the Mexican Government. They were of that hardy, intelligent race who were the pioneers of civilization on the North American Continent, and they brought with them the qualities that make men great and useful. They were imbued with the love of liberty, and of the principles upon which the United States Government was founded. The colonists settled on the rich alluvial lands of the Brazas, Trinity, and Colorado Rivers. Attending strictly to their own affairs, they avoided the various political complications of the government under which they had come to live. Yet their very prudence became their offense. They were annoyed, and finally oppressed, by that despotic government. Then, throwing off all allegiance to Mexico, they declared their independence, and with their swords carved their boundaries from the Sabine to the Rio Grande.

The men who formed the constitution of 1836 were typical of the free institutions under which they were born. Descendants of

* The a in Tejas pronounced soft.

the men of 1776, the first act of the newly freed people of Texas was to extend invitation and welcome to all the world, by offering to every man who would come among them a portion of the domain they had won. To each head of a family they gave forty-four hundred acres, and to each single man fourteen hundred and eighty acres. These generous inducements offered by the Republic, as well as her chivalric and romantic history, attracted settlers from all directions. A government patterned after that of the United States was formed, and the Republic of Texas established itself among the nations as a sovereign power, recognized and respected.

Nine years of independence passed away—from 1837 to 1846—when, after due deliberation, without pressure from any source, like the son who had wandered from his father's roof and tested the world's attractions, but found nothing so congenial as the old home, the men of Texas, seeking no grander destiny, asking no other fate, threw this magnificent empire, all their own, this rich diadem glittering with deeds of patriotism, courage, and wisdom, at the feet of the mother country, and became a part of the great American Union. The survivors of that time, and of those events, look back through the dim vista of time upon the historic drama of 1846, only to realize that the annexation of Texas was the direct cause of the war with Mexico, the acquisition of California, and of the political questions beginning with the repeal of the Missouri compromise and culminating in the war between the States, which closed at Appomattox. Yet these patriarchs feel that their action was right, and that the fate which ruled it was the fate of brothers; and with their brothers they shared it.

In 1865, at the close of the war, Texas was demoralized and almost ruined. It is true she had been spared the tramp of hostile armies; yet her material wealth was gone, her loss in slaves alone being a hundred and thirty-seven millions of dollars. Her labor system had been destroyed, confidence had fled, and hope had departed. The pursuits of the people, be it remembered, had been essentially agricultural and pastoral; but agriculture lay paralyzed, and the flocks and herds of the grazer were scattered and lost. Added to such misfortune, the iron heel of the conqueror came to crush the really brave and genuine manhood of Texas. But the men who had strongly met the storm of war were prepared to meet its consequences—the placing in their stead the

selfish stranger and the ignorant negro. Governed, however, by a class that only sought the deeper degradation of the people, we can understand that Texans naturally reverted to the oppressions of Mexican rule, and found no consolation by comparison. The days seemed dark indeed. This state of things, ameliorating gradually but with agonizing slowness, came to an end in 1874. Reason resumed her throne. After nine years of experience, those who controlled the government of the nation realized that the way to treat brave men was to trust them, and so restored to the people their political rights. Upon this restoration, Texas entered with a bound, as it were, upon her new career.

And what of the State to-day?

Imperial in her domain, attractive in the variety of good and rare things she possesses, she is again able to say: "Tekas"—"Welcome." And to what does she invite?

Embracing all the territory between the 94th and 106th degrees of west longitude, and the 26th and 36th degrees of north latitude—a territory of two hundred and seventy-four thousand square miles—larger than New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Maryland combined—larger than the half of Europe, omitting Russia—she can support a population equal to the present population of the United States, and yet not crowd her people. She has a genial climate whose uniformity of temperature gives health and comfort, and does not shut up labor for six months in the year with ice and snow. She has a soil rich and diversified, producing wheat as in California, cotton as in Egypt, and corn as in Illinois. She is the grazing ground of a continent, where within the memory of man countless herds of buffalo roamed over her prairies, from her northern to her southern boundary, but whose trails are now covered with inclosures, breeding cattle with which to feed the world.

Let me call earnest attention to a few remarkable facts, which I take from the official reports of the State. Our tables of statistics show that in 1836 the population numbered about fifty thousand. In forty-nine years it has increased fifty-fold, and we now have two and a half millions. Fifteen years ago, in 1870, the assessed value of property was a little less than a hundred and fifty millions of dollars. It is now six hundred and three millions. Yet the tax-rate for 1885 is only twenty-five cents on the hundred dollars, one-half of which is for the public schools.

In this important matter of public schools and the education of our youth, it must be remembered that the fathers of '36 set aside one-tenth of the annual revenue of their Republic for a perpetual school fund, and also granted to each county four leagues of land, or twenty thousand acres. Still, in addition, they set aside fifty leagues—more than two hundred and twenty thousand acres—for a university. Subsequently the State of Texas donated to railroads sixteen alternate sections of land to the mile, and coupled this donation with the obligation to survey an equal area for the school-fund. This fund now owns, from that source, thirty-two millions of acres, worth, at the minimum government price, sixty-four millions of dollars. It has, besides, seven millions in cash, bonds, and stocks, which yield even more than two and a quarter million as an available school fund for the year 1885, allowing each child in the State five dollars for six months' tuition. The increase in value of the school lands, whether from lease or from sale to actual settlers, will in a short time relieve the people from paying any school tax at all; for, with the interest on nearly a hundred millions of capital invested, there will be enough revenue for the grandest free-school system ever known.

I have stated the taxable value of all the property of Texas at six hundred and three millions of dollars. Let me enumerate, in round numbers, a few of the items which go to make up that sum.

The land is counted at about two hundred and forty-seven millions, not including eighty-six millions for town lots. Cattle stand for eighty-one millions; horses, thirty-two millions; sheep, nine millions; and hogs, two millions. The assessed value of railroads is forty millions. The merchandise of the State is put down at twenty-nine millions; and the money on hand, twelve millions and a half.

Of the two hundred and seventy-four thousand square miles of Texan territory, twenty millions are rich in minerals—iron, coal, copper, lead, and silver. The timber lands, with a hundred and ninety-four varieties of wood, comprise forty-six millions of acres. And over this various territory run, already, seventy-three hundred miles of railroad, connecting us with the markets of the world. The crop estimates for 1885 include thirteen hundred thousand bales of cotton, four million bushels of wheat, eight million bushels of corn, and thirty-two million pounds of wool.

Twelve million head of live stock sustain themselves on our three hundred and fifty-three varieties of the grasses. We can feed New England with cheap meat. We can supply Old England with fine beef, France with fat mutton, and ingratiate Germany with the best of pork, though not one-fifth of the area of Texas is yet occupied or utilized. We have a good government, a moral, Christian population, with activity, progress, and peace on every hand. Where on earth are such inducements for the present, and such prospects for the future? Tekas—welcome! Come and share with us all these blessings.

JOHN IRELAND.

MOTLEY AND MONARCH.

STRANGE mingling of mirth and tears, of the tragic and grotesque, of cap and crown, of Socrates and Rabelais, of Æsop and Marcus Aurelius, of all that is gentle and just, humorous and honest, merciful, wise, laughable, lovable, and divine, and all consecrated to the use of man; while through all, and over all, an overwhelming sense of obligation, of chivalric loyalty to truth, and upon all the shadow of the tragic end.

Nearly all the great historic characters are impossible monsters, disproportioned by flattery, or by calumny deformed. We know nothing of their peculiarities, or nothing but their peculiarities. About the roots of these oaks there clings none of the earth of humanity. Washington is now only a steel engraving. About the real man who lived and loved and hated and schemed we know but little. The glass through which we look at him is of such high magnifying power that the features are exceedingly indistinct. Hundreds of people are now engaged in smoothing out the lines of Lincoln's face—forcing all features to the common mold—so that he may be known, not as he really was, but, according to their poor standard, as he should have been.

Lincoln was not a type. He stands alone—no ancestors, no fellows, and no successors. He had the advantage of living in a new country, of social equality, of personal freedom, of seeing in the horizon of his future the perpetual star of hope. He preserved his individuality and his self-respect. He knew and mingled with men of every kind; and, after all, men are the best books. He became acquainted with the ambitions and hopes of the heart, the means used to accomplish ends, the springs of action and the seeds of thought. He was familiar with nature, with actual things, with common facts. He loved and appreciated the poem of the year, the drama of the seasons.

In a new country a man must possess at least three virtues—honesty, courage, and generosity. In cultivated society, cultivation is often more important than soil. A well-executed counterfeit passes more readily than a blurred genuine. It is necessary only to observe the unwritten laws of society—to be honest enough to keep out of prison, and generous enough to subscribe in public—where the subscription can be defended as an investment. In a new country, character is essential; in the old, reputation is sufficient. In the new, they find what a man really is; in the old, he generally passes for what he resembles. People separated only by distance are much nearer together than those divided by the walls of caste.

It is no advantage to live in a great city, where poverty degrades and failure brings despair. The fields are lovelier than paved streets, and the great forest than walls of brick. Oaks and elms are more poetic than steeples and chimneys. In the country is the idea of home. There you see the rising and setting sun; you become acquainted with the stars and clouds. The constellations are your friends. You hear the rain on the roof and listen to the rhythmic sighing of the winds. You are thrilled by the resurrection called Spring, touched and saddened by Autumn, the grace and poetry of death. Every field is a picture, a landscape; every landscape a poem; every flower a tender thought; and every forest a fairy-land. In the country you preserve your identity—your personality. There you are an aggregation of atoms, but in the city you are only an atom of an aggregation.

Lincoln never finished his education. To the night of his death he was a pupil, a learner, an inquirer, a seeker after knowledge. You have no idea how many men are spoiled by what is called education. For the most part, colleges are places where pebbles are polished and diamonds are dimmed. If Shakespeare had graduated at Oxford, he might have been a quibbling attorney or a hypocritical parson.

Lincoln was a many-sided man, acquainted with smiles and tears, complex in brain, single in heart, direct as light; and his words, candid as mirrors, gave the perfect image of his thought. He was never afraid to ask—never too dignified to admit that he did not know. No man had keener wit or kinder humor. He was not solemn. Solemnity is a mask worn by ignorance and

hypocrisy—it is the preface, prologue, and index to the cunning or the stupid. He was natural in his life and thought—master of the story-teller's art, in illustration apt, in application perfect, liberal in speech, shocking Pharisees and prudes, using any word that wit could disinfect.

He was a logician. Logic is the necessary product of intelligence and sincerity. It cannot be learned. It is the child of a clear head and a good heart. He was candid, and with candor often deceived the deceitful. He had intellect without arrogance, genius without pride, and religion without cant—that is to say, without bigotry and without deceit.

He was an orator—clear, sincere, natural. He did not pretend. He did not say what he thought others thought, but what he thought. If you wish to be sublime you must be natural—you must keep close to the grass. You must sit by the fireside of the heart: above the clouds it is too cold. You must be simple in your speech: too much polish suggests insincerity. The great orator idealizes the real, transfigures the common, makes even the inanimate throb and thrill, fills the gallery of the imagination with statues and pictures perfect in form and color, brings to light the gold hoarded by memory—the miser shows the glittering coin to the spendthrift hope—enriches the brain, ennobles the heart, and quickens the conscience. Between his lips words bud and blossom.

If you wish to know the difference between an orator and an elocutionist—between what is felt and what is said—between what the heart and brain can do together and what the brain can do alone—read Lincoln's wondrous words at Gettysburg, and then the speech of Edward Everett. The oration of Lincoln will never be forgotten. It will live until languages are dead and lips are dust. The speech of Everett will never be read. The elocutionists believe in the virtue of voice, the sublimity of syntax, the majesty of long sentences, and the genius of gesture. The orator loves the real, the simple, the natural. He places the thought above all. He knows that the greatest ideas should be expressed in the shortest words—that the greatest statues need the least drapery.

Lincoln was an immense personality—firm but not obstinate. Obstinacy is egotism—firmness, heroism. He influenced others without effort, unconsciously; and they submitted to him as

men submit to nature, unconsciously. He was severe with himself, and for that reason lenient with others. He appeared to apologize for being kinder than his fellows. He did merciful things as stealthily as others committed crimes. Almost ashamed of tenderness, he said and did the noblest words and deeds with that charming confusion—that awkwardness—that is the perfect grace of modesty. As a noble man, wishing to pay a small debt to a poor neighbor, reluctantly offers a hundred-dollar bill and asks for change, fearing that he may be suspected either of making a display of wealth or a pretense of payment, so Lincoln hesitated to show his wealth of goodness, even to the best he knew.

A great man stooping, not wishing to make his fellows feel that they were small or mean.

He knew others, because perfectly acquainted with himself. He cared nothing for place, but everything for principle, nothing for money, but everything for independence. Where no principle was involved, easily swayed—willing to go slowly if in the right direction—sometimes willing to stop, but he would not go back, and he would not go wrong. He was willing to wait. He knew that the event was not waiting, and that fate was not the fool of chance. He knew that slavery had defenders, but no defense, and that they who attack the right must wound themselves. He was neither tyrant nor slave. He neither knelt nor scorned. With him, men were neither great nor small—they were right or wrong. Through manners, clothes, titles, rags, and race, he saw the real—that which is. Beyond accident, policy, compromise, and war, he saw the end. He was patient as Destiny, whose undecipherable hieroglyphs were so deeply graven on his sad and tragic face.

Nothing discloses real character like the use of power. It is easy for the weak to be gentle. Most people can bear adversity. But if you wish to know what a man really is, give him power. This is the supreme test. It is the glory of Lincoln that, having almost absolute power, he never abused it, except upon the side of mercy.

Wealth could not purchase, power could not awe, this divine, this loving man. He knew no fear except the fear of doing wrong. Hating slavery, pitying the master—seeking to conquer, not persons, but prejudices—he was the embodiment of the self-denial, the courage, the hope, and the nobility of a nation. He spoke, not to inflame, not to upbraid, but to convince. He raised his

hands, not to strike, but in benediction. He longed to pardon. He loved to see the pearls of joy on the cheeks of a wife whose husband he had rescued from death.

Lincoln was the grandest figure of the fiercest civil war. He is the gentlest memory of our world.

ROBERT G. INGERSOLL.

ROME AND THE INQUISITIONS.

Two hundred and forty-two years ago, in one of Rome's majestic palaces, before an illustrious assemblage of Roman dignitaries, arrayed in all the gorgeous magnificence of Roman ecclesiasticism, there stood an aged man of venerable mien, who looked the very man he was—the Nestor of mathematical science.

The great churchmen who surrounded composed the dreaded court of the Roman Inquisition, and they ere long adjudged him guilty of heresy in proclaiming the scientific doctrine that the earth revolves around the sun.

That man was Galileo Galilei, and in his condemnation by so mighty a power, the world abroad believed that science had received her martyrdom.

Galileo's conviction and censure embodied a condemnation, by the congregation of the Inquisition and the Index, of his theories respecting the movement of the earth and its relation to the universe as false and unscriptural—a decision rendered by a court of ecclesiastics not wholly responsible to the church for its judgment, as the latter has never spoken on faith or morals save through the person of her supreme pontiff pronouncing an *ex cathedrâ* judgment.

The inquisitorial process against Galileo in 1633, being wholly under the control of the "Holy Office," bears no expression or pledge of papal authority, while the bishops scattered throughout the world had no voice in the affair.

But the court of Inquisition had blundered—its blunder was indeed a mighty one, its censure hasty and unwarranted, and it must forever bear the stigma of creating by its imprudent verdict the most baneful impressions on the scientific and religious worlds of that day and of ours.

The office of the Roman Congregation had been to detect and subsequently to judge the heretical suspect; and if necessary to administer punishment in the form of imprisonment in cases of

obstinacy. Beyond this it could not act. It had naught to do with the defining and promulgation of articles of faith or morals. It was an eminently local congregation of cardinals, who hesitated to search far beyond the confines of Italy for heretical sentiments; and, furthermore, its decisions were in no case final in the eyes of the church.

The judgment of the court was virtually the honest opinion of the ecclesiastics composing it. Copernicanism, as far back as 1616, had been branded as false and heretical by the congregations of the Index and Inquisition, but neither the decree of 1616 nor that of 1633 bears even the semblance of papal approbation—a self-evident proof that there was a yet higher power, the church in the person of her pontiff, which the Index knew constituted the great court of appeals, and which alone might pronounce an infallible verdict.

The concensus of eminent churchmen affords us, perhaps, the safest way to discover the sentiments prevailing subsequent to the trial of Galileo.

In 1651 the Jesuit Riccioli advises the propriety of respecting the censure "until the judges, either by themselves recognizing, or being shown by others, the truth of the demonstration, withdraw it." (See "Almagest. Nov.," tom. ii. p. 489.)

Ten years later the Grand Penitentiary Fabri reminded his contemporaries that the Copernicans had not yet published a satisfactory demonstration, and speaks his opinion thus: "But if haply one should be some time excogitated by you (which I should hardly fancy), the church will in nowise hesitate to declare that those passages (of Scripture) are to be understood in a figured and improper sense." (See a letter from Anzout to Abbé Charles, 1664, "Memoirs de l'Académie des Sciences," Paris.)

Father Grassi, S.J., and the great Cistercian Caramuel ("Theol. Moral. Fundun."), maintained in their writings a similar position without molestation; and Father Faune, S.J., himself opposed to Copernicanism, and a bosom friend of Pope Pius VI., declares with some enthusiasm that it was never condemned by papal bull or ecumenical council. (See "Annot. to Notæ in Enchirea.," St. August., Romæ, 1775.)

The *major et sanior pars* of the community and church never sought to maintain the decrees of the Roman Congregations to be irreformable. Indeed, the extremest of the advocates of the

powers of the Index did not venture to assert that its judgments were beyond appeal.

The great Bellarmino, himself a veritable "hammer of heretics," was not an exception to the general run.

Copernicus had given his immortal work "De Revolutionibus Orbium," to the world in 1543, fully twelve years subsequent to its actual completion, by reason of his fear of its immediate effects on the church and society. To conciliate the former, he finally dedicated it to the reigning pontiff, Paul III.

No court of Inquisition was convened for his trial, nor were his works anathematized. The Copernican theory was so mighty an innovation on the universal medieval belief that the earth controlled all the planets and the sun, as the central power of the universe, and that Scripture itself sustained it at least by imputation, that the whole world was startled. All the learned men of the age read and discussed the new theories, and Pope Paul felt highly honored in the dedication to him of so great a work.

It was not until 1616, when the conflict of Copernicanism with the Ptolemaic and Aristotelian theories was at its uttermost height, that some decision was demanded by the enemies of the new school of science.

The same forces were gathered at this time as were marshaled at the condemnation of Galileo—the fanatical supporters of the laws of antiquity had come to conquer, and the decree of the Index proclaimed the falsity of Copernicanism. But the church and her pontiff were silent! Rome had not spoken!

If the church herself had condemned the theories of Copernicus in the seventeenth century, would she not do likewise in the nineteenth? No single instance can be given in history in which the church either through pontiff or council has ever revoked an article of faith or morals pronounced by any preceding pope or council.

In all matters referring to faith and morals the church has held, and still holds, herself to be immutable. The silence of the pope in 1633, following Galileo's censure, is a self-evident proof that the spirit of the church coincided with the public declaration in our day by a celebrated and learned churchman, that "faith and morals were not concerned in the question of the revolution of the earth around the sun," that "time was necessary to ascertain the fact that the earth does move," and that Scripture does not teach the contrary.

The opinion of the Roman prelates was presumably honest, even if false; and the world looked on complacently for future developments, regarding the "Index Expurgatorius" as the best possible place for such untenable hypotheses, however grand in conception.

It was in 1632 that Galileo gave to the public his "Un dialogo intomo i due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo." It was the first production of its kind, and since the days of Copernicus the theories and notions of antiquity in their bearing on science had not endured so scathing a criticism—they were virtually expunged from the domain of truth. "El dialogo" was the philosopher's masterly assertion and lucid explanation of theories which he could positively prove *true* from the long record of scientific experiments which have bestowed on him the immortal dignity of "Father of experimental science."

As in 1616 so in 1633, the church and pontiff were silent. May not that silence imply that the arraignment of Galileo on the ground of heresy was as local in interest as was the court in imposition ?

The Church Universal, in the persons of her bishops and pope, though seemingly indifferent as to the verdict of the Inquisition, were doubtless thoroughly interested in the final results of scientific research, but chose to do no more than clothe the new theories in the habit of possibility or of probability.

It was sufficient for the end that time should play her part in proving or disproving what an irresponsible court had anathematized.

History has brought down to us, as an apology for the blunder, the details of a personal resentment on the part of Pope Urban toward his former friend Galileo, created by a real or imaginary satirization of the former, under the title "Simplicio" in "Un dialogo, etc.," in which Galileo views the pontiff in the light of a man careless of scientific truth, and a greater lover of the laws of the ancients, regardless of recent scientific research.

If Urban personally brought to bear the weight of the "Holy Office" on his real or imaginary foe, the world may never know it as a positive fact, and Urban may yet be spared the imputed character of an unchristian pope with an otherwise unblemished pontificate.

If false, this personal difficulty might better be silenced ; but

if true, it fully answers the accusation that the Roman Church of the seventeenth century was the enemy of science, though at the same time it bestows dishonor on the head of the church. The Church Universal, then, may not be made to suffer through the acts of her irresponsible prelates. She has formally declared her principles and defined her position toward science in the syllabus of the last Vatican Council: "Let him be anathema . . . . who shall say that it may at any time come to pass in the progress of science, that the doctrines set forth by the church must be taken in another sense than that in which the church has ever received and yet receives them."

This she regards as an infallible and final judgment, as it was formulated by a general council and promulgated by the sovereign pontiff, Pius IX., *ex cathedrâ*. In it immutability in faith is declared. It moreover implies the necessity of submitting the theories of science to be judged by revealed religion, rather than to join without due investigation many of the wild sallies of scientific hypothesis.

The *ex cathedrâ* voice of the church is irreformable. The voice of the congregation of the Inquisition may be as easily false as true.

The average reader never ceases to connect the code and acts of the Roman with those of the Spanish Inquisition. It is, indeed, a very easy task to discover the collateral tie, but a very difficult one to conscientiously compare their histories in the light of one and the same institution. Founded in 1248 under Innocent IV., its primary object was the guarding of Christian faith and morals against the adverse influences of the various sects that arose from time to time during the later middle ages, and whose votaries had finally become so bold and treacherous that heresy was regarded in those days as the very worst of crimes.

Administered at first by the zealous Dominicans, the "Holy Office" was the means of instituting the most salutary reforms. It was not until it became identified with the state that its nature and purpose were corrupted into a tool of the unscrupulous monarch, whereby its religious characteristics were obliterated in Western Europe, acquiring in later days the opprobrious name of "Spanish Inquisition." That section of the Inquisition operating in Italy, being under the immediate and paternal influence of

the popes, retained its ancient characteristics, and remains to this day a purely religious tribunal.

The church's creed evidently does not embody oppression among its articles, though such was the predominant spirit among the Spanish Inquisitors. Indeed, from their clutches not even an eminent ecclesiastic could free himself when once rendering himself a suspect; and it was only after a mighty struggle that Sixtus IV. succeeded, by pure virtue of his office, in debarring the establishment of its courts in those cities of Italy then belonging to Spain.

Yielding to the urgent appeals of Isabella, Sixtus, in 1480, consented to its establishment as a means, more political than religious, of preserving the integrity of the monarchy, then disturbed by the intrigues of the Moors and Jews and countless criminals.

The pontiffs were ever ready to extend the hand of charity and offer asylum to the unhappy refugees of every creed and race who sought protection from the fury of the inquisitors; and the seeming anomaly of a pope excommunicating an inquisitor for severity of judgment and heartlessness in punishment, was but the repetition of the paternal acts of a long line of pontiff kings.

The Inquisition became virtually a handy instrument of the Spanish crown, and the popes continued in succession to wage a merciless warfare against its practices. Sixtus wrote at least one letter to the sovereigns of Spain, and admonished them that "mercy toward the guilty was more pleasing to God than the severity which they were using."

The atrocities of the Spanish institution were thoroughly Spanish, and the Roman Church may hold herself irresponsible for them. She more than once has seen her own bishops summoned before that arbitrary tribunal with no hope of pardon or freedom, even through the good offices of the Holy See.

The Spanish Court of Inquisition was a mixed tribunal, composed equally of lay and clerical members, and its authority ultimately commenced and ended with the crown; and to give it a yet more civil character, it followed the example of the common law, and followed up conviction and punishment by an arbitrary confiscation of personal property.

The king filled his treasury with these spoils.

It was to the advantage of the royal family to covertly encourage its excesses.

On the other hand, the penal code of the Inquisition was merciful and just when compared with the code of the kingdom as administered in the time of Charles V.

The latter was rife in red-hot pincers, mutilation, and terrible methods of capital punishment, while the Inquisition was free from all such barbarities. (Compare Hefeli's "Life of Ximenes.")

Even Florenti, the fallen priest-historian and avowed enemy of the inquisitors, declares in detail that a marked difference was evident between the inquisitorial and government prisons; and this nominally religious court enjoyed ere long the reputation of being the justest tribunal in Christendom, a title which, to us, may seem wholly inapplicable to a court that occasioned by its own voluntary acts so much misery and suffering.

Whatever accusations may be hurled against the Roman Congregations in the exercise of their offices, it is a solemn historical fact that, during the long and varied careers of those powerful tribunals, no authenticated case of capital punishment has ever occurred in the dominions of the pope, where they exercised their chief authority.

The Index and the Inquisition still survive in Rome, and though not as far-reaching in their influence and powers, yet are equally important in the government of the Church Universal. The inquisitorial processes against heresy and heretical publications still continue at Rome, the capital of the Christian world, and the judgments of the Index are still presumably true, though by no means beyond appeal. The pressure of public opinion in church and society constitutes a powerful safeguard against any possibility of an arbitrary act, while at the same time it confers a blessing on the church by thwarting every inclination toward blunder.

A. KINGSLEY GLOVER.

AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT.

One afternoon in June, 1843, while I was at West Point, a candidate for admission to the Military Academy, I wandered into the riding hall, where the members of the graduating class were going through their final mounted exercises before Major Richard Delafield, the distinguished engineer, then superintendent, the Academic Board, and a large assemblage of spectators. When the regular services were completed, the class, still mounted, was formed in line through the center of the hall, the riding-master placed the leaping-bar higher than a man's head, and called out "*Cadet Grant!*" A clean-faced, slender, blue-eyed young fellow, weighing about 120 pounds, dashed from the ranks on a powerfully built chestnut-sorrel horse, and galloped down the opposite side of the hall. As he turned at the farther end and came into the straight stretch across which the bar was placed, the horse increased his pace, and, measuring his strides for the great leap before him, bounded into the air and cleared the bar, carrying his rider as if man and beast had been welded together. The spectators were breathless! "*Very well done, sir!*" growled "old Hershberger," the riding-master, and the class was dismissed and disappeared; but "Cadet Grant" remained a living image in my memory.

A few months before graduation, one of Grant's classmates, James A. Hardie, said to his friend and instructor, "Well, sir, if a great emergency arises in this country during our life-time, Sam. Grant will be the man to meet it."* If I had heard Hardie's prediction I doubt not I should have believed in it, for I thought the young man who could perform the feat of horsemanship I had witnessed, and wore a sword, could do anything.

* In the summer of 1845, only two years after Grant's graduation, his classmate and room-mate, George Deshon, now a Catholic priest in New York City, said at West Point, in presence of Professor Kendrick and Mr. Stebbins of Springfield, Mass., that Grant would some day prove to the Academic Board that he was the strongest man in his class.

I was in General Grant's room in New York City on the 25th of May, 1885. Forty years had elapsed since Hardie's prediction was made, and it had been amply fulfilled. But, alas! the hand of death was upon the hero of it. Though brave and cheerful, he was almost voiceless. Before him were sheets of his forthcoming book, and a few artist's proofs of a steel engraving of himself made from a daguerreotype taken soon after his graduation. He wrote my name and his own upon one of the engravings and handed it to me. I said, "General, this looks as you did the first time I ever saw you. It was when you made the great jump in the riding exercises of your graduation." "Yes," he whispered, "I remember that very well. York was a wonderful horse. I could feel him gathering under me for the effort as he approached the bar. Have you heard anything lately of Hershberger?" I replied, "No, I never heard of him after he left West Point years ago." "Oh," said the general, "I have heard of him since the war. He was in Carlisle, old and poor, and I sent him a check for fifty dollars." This early friendship had lived for forty years, and the old master was enabled to say near the close of his pupil's career, as he had said at the beginning of it, "Very well done, sir!"

During the period of Grant's official authority, I saw but little of him. I was not one of the so-called "Grant men" of the army. It was not until we were near neighbors in New York City, in 1881–5, that I became well acquainted with him. At that time he was out of office, and the third term movement to restore him to the Presidency had failed. My acquaintance began with the cadet. It matured with the general, and was not disturbed by partiality or interest. Grant was always free from arrogance of office, but in the little I had seen of him, prior to 1881, I had not been able to get through the crust of his natural reserve or diffidence, and I was behind those who knew him well, in my estimate of his character and ability. By constant and free personal relations with him for the last three or four years of his life, and a fuller study of his career, I caught up and perceived the soundness of the exalted public judgment of this remarkable man.

It may be said, without detracting from his merits, that perhaps a knowledge of his many good and great deeds has tended to make it somewhat the fashion, since Grant's death, to try and lift him above all the imperfections of men. The sounder view is that he

was not free from human frailties, but was great in spite of them. He was what military men call "unsoldierly" in feeling, bearing, and appearance; yet he was a great general, and the most essential trait of soldiership, obedience, was next to a religion with him. He knew the value of discipline in an army, but he had neither taste nor aptitude for establishing or enforcing it, and instinctively relied more upon *the man* than upon *the soldier*. He loved and cherished his army associations above all others, but did not like the profession of arms. In an interview with him last winter, I alluded to his lack of fondness for purely military affairs, whereupon he selected a sheet from the proofs which lay before him, and as evidence of his taste, pointed to a statement therein, to the effect that soon after he entered the army, in 1843, he reviewed his West Point studies, in order to prepare himself for a professorship in some institution of learning and leave the military service.

In disposition, Grant was patient, kind, and considerate. In manner, he was natural, quiet, and unassuming, somewhat diffident, but not bashful or awkward. He had no readiness in showing off his acquirements; on the contrary, his acquirements did not appear until forced to the front, and then they showed him off without his knowing it. He was well educated, but it is probably true that the first impression he made upon strangers was that he was a plain man without elements of greatness. A closer acquaintance, however, hardly ever failed to create firm belief in his extraordinary reserve power. While truth, courage, tenacity, and self-reliance were his ruling traits, he had but little pride of opinion. He did not hesitate in choosing the best course, no matter who proposed it; and in military affairs he would execute a plan prescribed by higher authority with as much vigor and fidelity as if it had been his own. He did not trouble himself about the past or the future, but concentrated all his faculties upon the matter he was at the moment called upon by his duty to deal with.

Neither responsibility, nor turmoil, nor danger, nor pleasure, nor pain, impaired the force of his resolution, or interrupted the steady flow of his intellect. The war is full of illustrations of his bravery and determination of character, and of his self-reliance and self-possession under trying circumstances. History does not record a more heroic personal effort than the one he made in writing a book, when he was in agony and on the verge of the grave, to rescue his family from the misfortunes that had befallen them.

Grant possessed some humor, and occasionally told a story, but rarely indulged in figures of speech, and did not exaggerate or emphasize even for the purpose of illustration. If he had any imagination it was kept under by his habit of literal truth. He made no use of expletives and but little of adjectives. He would not have indulged in profane language even if he had possessed no religious scruples on the subject. Though he was not without temper and resentment, he was so patient and matter-of-fact, that he never felt inclined to *damn* things, as men, when sorely tried, sometimes do.

In congenial company he conversed with pleasure and fluency, but he felt no obligation to talk for the mere purpose of entertaining the persons in his presence. He spoke only because he had something to tell. Having no regard for forms of expression, he never, in writing or speaking, turned sentences for effect, nor could he dissemble or use words to mislead. If he did not wish to express his thoughts he was silent, and left people to draw their own inferences.

He had unlimited faith in those whom he once took to his heart. His friendship was accompanied by the fullest confidence, and, when his choice was not wisely made, it served to facilitate and to shield evil practices, which it is the duty of that high sentiment to restrain; and thus Grant's friendship sometimes injured him who gave and him who received it. It was a principle with him never to abandon a comrade "under fire;" and a friend in disgrace, as well as a friend in trouble, could depend upon him until Grant himself found him guilty. I called upon Grant on Sunday evening, May 4, 1883, the day that he borrowed the hundred and fifty thousand dollars from Vanderbilt. He was very cheerful, and said to me, "I expect to have a game of cards on Tuesday night, and would be glad to have you come." As I was taking my leave he repeated the invitation, but thinking the meeting might depend upon further arrangements, as sometimes happened, I thanked him, and said I would hold myself subject to his call. "No," he replied, "don't wait for further notice. Ward is certainly coming, and the party is made." On Tuesday morning, about 11 o'clock, I met Grant by chance in a car going down-town. He was upon crutches on account of the accident he had met with some time before. He talked about persons and events of the war, without restraint, and was so much intereste din conversa-

tion that he failed to get out at the station he intended. As he left the car he said, "I shall expect you to-night." By a singular coincidence we fell into the same car going up-town about 3 P.M., and I again seated myself by his side. After a few minutes of gloomy silence on his part, he said, "We will not have the meeting I fixed for to-night; I have bad news." I replied, "Why, general, I hope it is nothing serious." "Yes," he continued, "the Marine Bank has failed or is about to fail. It owes our firm a large amount, and I suppose we are ruined. When I went down-town this morning I thought I was worth a great deal of money, now I don't know that I have a dollar; and probably my sons, too, have lost everything." I had heard nothing of the financial crash which had occurred during the day. I said, "General, do you suspect Ward?" He replied, "You know I expected him at my house to-night. If he had come to the office any time to-day and assured me all was right, I should have believed him and gone home contented. But I waited until nearly 3 o'clock, and he did not appear. I do not know what to think." He was not willing even then to accuse the knave in whom he had confided, and prior to that time, notwithstanding warnings which would have aroused a dishonest man, had no suspicion that villainy had been practiced. After he became aware of the truth, three or four days passed before the enormity of the disaster made its full impression upon him, but he never recovered from the shock of the deception and wrong practiced upon him by one of the basest creatures of the age.

Grant's self-reliance and integrity were so deeply seated and highly developed that it was difficult for him to make the wishes and opinions of others the basis of his own action in public affairs. Hence, though long a controlling factor in politics, he never was a politician. Destitute of the simplest arts of deception, silence was his recourse when urged to action he did not approve. Hence he was called silent, and sometimes even stolid.

Prior to 1867, Grant was nothing but a soldier. He regarded his election to the chief magistracy of the nation as a promotion, and did not at first realize that while the scope of his authority had been enlarged its nature had been changed, and that he could not govern the country as he had governed the army. He soon discovered that his forces, now political instead of military, could not be concentrated upon the line of operations he had laid down;

and he promptly changed base to the party that elected him, and then advanced upon the new line with as much confidence and fidelity as if it had been his first choice. That movement consolidated his military prestige, his personal power, and the political strength of the Republican Party into a public force, of which—contrary to the fated powerlessness of ex-Presidents generally—he was the real head to the day of his death, and which has never been surpassed, if it has been equaled, in this country. When the change of base just mentioned became known, many of Grant's old friends thought he had surrendered to the politicians, but he had not; nor was his new course inconsistent with his self-reliance and stern sense of duty. He had become sensible of the fact that to enforce "no policy against the will of the people," a part of public affairs had to be conducted according to the principles and dogmas of the dominant party; and as far as he could clearly identify that part he let those whom he regarded as party leaders have it to themselves. But in all other matters—in fact, upon special occasions in these—he relied upon himself and acted up to his own sense of duty, and demanded "unconditional surrender" from all who opposed him. He not only crushed Charles Sumner, who ventured into revolt, but probably would have succeeded in preventing his return to the United States Senate, if that distinguished leader had not died before the time came for his re-election.

Grant wrote with remarkable facility. His war papers are not only his own composition, but many of them are in his own handwriting. His article in the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW of November, 1882, is an example of the rapidity with which he could write what he had to say, as well as of the clearness and force with which he expressed his meaning. It was commenced on the 24th of October, and was in the editor's hands on the 25th. He said of it at the time:

> "It does not appear to me worthy of a place in a magazine of the standing of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. It was dictated from notes prepared hastily. The subject, however, has become so familiar to me, that I think I have committed no error in the statement of facts."

Grant showed but little interest in abstruse subjects, and rarely took part in the discussion of them. His conversation was always marked by simplicity, and freedom from vanity, vainglory, and mock-modesty. His excellent memory was a store-house upon

which he drew for the interesting reminiscences which formed the staple of his conversation.

He was wise, but, having no gifts as a debater, he could not shine in council. It was his nature or his habit, as heretofore stated, to concentrate his mind upon subjects which required his own action, or for which he was responsible.

The prominence of these affairs, the precedence of the practical and personal over the theoretical and general, sometimes misled the public judgment as to his real power and ability. Like many great men, he required the pressure of necessity to bring out his strength. He could not dwell upon theories, or appear to advantage in hypothetical cases, and even in practical matters his mental processes were carried on beneath the surface. Until he was ready to act he gave no sign by word or expression of his own train of thought or the impression made upon him by others, though they might make him change his mind and induce action different from what he had intended. He generally adhered to his first convictions, but never halted long between two opinions. When he changed he went over without qualification or regard for consequences, and was not disturbed by lingering doubts or regrets.

The Fitz-John Porter case served to exhibit one of Grant's best traits—devotion to his own deliberate sense of duty, despite the temptations of interest, ease, and expediency. "Consistency is a jewel," but so is truth, and to Grant the latter was more precious than the former. Porter's claim that he had been wronged by the court-martial which convicted him in 1863, and that new evidence to prove it would be presented if a hearing could be granted, was laid before Grant as early as 1867, but the appeal was refused or neglected. As long as Grant was General-in-Chief of the army and President of the United States, with power to act effectively in redressing the alleged wrong, he accepted the verdict of the court-martial without understanding the record of that tribunal and the new evidence which Porter offered to produce. But in September, 1881, when he had become a private citizen and a resident of New York City, Porter asked an interview. To this Grant replied in writing, September 27, 1881 :

"I will hear what you have to say, and will endeavor to listen without prejudice; and if convinced that I was wrong in former opinions, entertained and possibly expressed, I would be willing to correct them."

The result was that Grant agreed to study the whole case, including the record of the court-martial, and state his conclusions. The investigation, which was prolonged till December 19, convinced him that a great wrong had been done, and he became deeply distressed that he had not mastered the subject while he was in power. Then, regardless of the inconsistent attitude in which his change of mind placed him, and the antagonisms it created, he devoted all of his ability and influence to procure for Porter the justice he thought due him. In a letter dated November 3, 1883, which was given to the public, he said to Porter :

"I did believe that General Pope was so odious to some of the officers in the East, that a cordial support was not given him by them. . . . I supposed you had shared in this feeling. . . . Until 1881, when I re-examined for myself, my belief was that on the 29th of August, 1862, a great battle was fought between General Pope commanding the Union forces, and General Jackson commanding the Confederate forces ; and that you with a corps of twelve or more thousand men stood in a position across the right flank of Jackson, and where you could easily get into his rear; that you received an order to do so about 5 or 5.30 o'clock, which you refused to obey because of clouds of dust in your front, which you contended indicated an enemy in superior force to you; that you allowed Pope to get beaten while you stood idly looking on without raising an arm to help him. With this understanding, and without a doubt as to the correctness of it, I condemned you."

Then he proceeded to give the results of his own examination of the case, expressed his regret that he had not made the investigation while he was in office, and added :

"As long as I have a voice it shall be raised in your support, without any reference to its effect upon me or others."

On the 30th of December, 1881, he replied as follows to a letter from Senator Logan :

"My dear General :

"I have your letter of yesterday. It is true that I have re-examined the proceedings of the court-martial and court of inquiry in Fitz-John Porter's case, and believe sincerely that I have done him an injustice, and have so written to the President. When I gave General Porter the letter, I requested him to send you a copy. If he has not done so he will, or I will. That letter will explain all I would otherwise write you on this subject. I reluctantly came to the conclusion I did, but was convinced beyond all preconceived notions, and felt it due to an accused man to say so. Very truly yours,

"U. S. Grant."

In a letter to Porter, dated February 4, 1882, he said:

"My whole object now is to benefit you; and to this end I am willing to do anything that is truthful."

Grant was slow to take offense, was not malicious, and did not hastily resent wrongs; but animosity sometimes found its way to his heart, and when rooted there it was as hardy as his friendship, though it did not assert itself in action unless specially invited by circumstances. His course towards his old associates of the regular army, while he was in power, affords many illustrations of his friendship, and possibly a few of the other kind. One of the bulletins which he issued during his last sickness announced that he desired the good-will of all; and he closed a letter from Mt. McGregor, dated June 22, 1885, with the words:

"I am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I am always willing to make the fullest admission."

That was not only the truth, but was no doubt the whole truth; and was quite as far as he was disposed to go. He had to be "convinced" that he had done injustice before he was willing to advance towards reconcilations. Some of his opinions of men were founded in error or misunderstanding, and some of his feelings possibly in prejudice; but as he believed they were right, it was not in the power of approaching death to make him surrender them. Mr. G. W. Childs has said:

"General Grant always felt that he was badly treated by Halleck. . . . During my long friendship with him I never heard him more than two or three times speak unkindly of Halleck."

Grant was unjustly accused after the capture of Donelson, and was dissatisfied with the treatment he received; but his animosity towards Halleck, born at Donelson, got its growth afterwards. The lapse of time and the whirl of events probably disqualified him for fixing the exact course of it, and confused him as to the time when it took substantial form.

During a conversation with Grant about his Shiloh article, after it had appeared in print, one of the persons present asked me whether it was true, as reported, that Buell was going to answer General Grant. I replied:

"I do not understand that he is going to answer General Grant, but he will write an article giving an account of the battle."

I then said to Grant:

"General, you and Buell will never agree about the battle of Shiloh, but in a recent letter to me, Buell spoke most kindly of you, saying, among other things, that when you and he were young together in the army you had, as he expressed it, 'attractive, even endearing qualities.'"

I waited for response, but in vain. Grant remained silent. I construed his action upon this and a subsequent occasion to mean that the remarks commendatory of Buell's character and ability, made in the Shiloh article, conveyed all he chose to express upon that subject as it then stood.

The bulk of Grant's admiration and friendship was no doubt bestowed upon Sherman, McPherson, and Sheridan. The day before he started from Nashville to Washington, in March, 1864, to receive his commission as lieutenant-general, Grant wrote a letter to Sherman expressing a full sense of his obligations to subordinates, and saying:

"I want to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. . . . I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction. The word you, I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also."

Grant had antipathies as well as attachments. His relations to his generals would form a striking chapter of history; and an interesting part of it would be the story of the estrangement between him and Hancock.

In his account of the battle of Shiloh published in the "Century Magazine," Grant said:

"The enemy had hardly started in retreat from his last position, when, looking back toward the river, I saw a division of troops coming up in beautiful order as if going on parade or review. The commander was at the head of the column, and the staff seemed to be bestowed about as they would have been had they been going on parade. When the head of the column came near where I was standing, it was halted, and the commanding officer, General A. McD. McCook, rode up to where I was, and appealed to me not to send his division any farther, saying that they were worn out with marching and fighting. . . . It was not, however, the rank and file or the junior officers who asked to be excused, but the division commander."

This was a remarkable error, and did great injustice to McCook. Grant, soon after the publication of the foregoing statement, and

subsequently in the "Century Magazine," admitted the injustice of it, but said nothing as to how he happened to make the mistake. Not long after the article appeared, I mentioned the error, and told the general I thought he had fallen into it by merging two occasions into one through a lapse of memory—that McCook's division did march in column and in dress parade order, from the river to the line of battle, and it made a fine spectacle, but it was quite early in the morning of the second day's fight. That, no doubt, was the spectacle which impressed itself upon the general's memory. But at that time the enemy had not "started in retreat from his last position." Indeed, the only question, then, was whether we could beat him, not whether we would pursue him. McCook's division, after marching up in column in dress parade order, formed line, attacked, and was actively engaged the rest of the day, and it was not until evening, when the enemy had been defeated, that the question of pursuit arose. "Then," I said to Grant, "you probably saw McCook a second time, and the conversation which you mention in the article took place." He admitted the probability that the explanation was correct.

When the second session of the last Congress began, a bill for the retirement of Grant as general of the army had passed the Senate, and was before the House, the Fitz-John Porter bill had been vetoed, and Grant, though a wreck financially and physically, had written to Porter, July 4

> "You can scarcely conceive the pain it caused me to read the veto of your bill by the President yesterday. I was not prepared for it. This message is the merest sophistry. It is, no doubt, a great disappointment to you and your family, but I believe it will result ultimately in doing you full justice. You were dismissed unjustly, and you are entitled to restoration. Be of good cheer, and pray that justice may yet be done you and yours."

This letter, of course, was not known to the President, but in the condition of affairs just set forth, President Arthur, in his last annual message, said :

> "I recommend that in recognition of the eminent services of Ulysses S. Grant, late general of the armies of the United States, and twice President of this nation, the Congress confer upon him a suitable pension."

This formal recommendation of a pension implied that the

President did not favor a bill to place Grant on the retired list of the army. Grant, in a letter to Senator Mitchell, dated December 5, 1884, requested that the pension bill be withdrawn, and said he would not accept a pension if the bill should pass and be approved. This ended the pension movement.

The well-deserved boon of retirement came at last, and with a unanimity and public approval that made it welcome, and the dying hero received it gratefully.

The time has not come for final judgment of Grant. He had great abilities and great opportunities. Chance is undoubtedly an important factor in the race of glory, and perhaps it favored Grant in the war of rebellion. General Sherman goes so far as to have said since Grant's death, that, "had C. F. Smith lived, Grant would have disappeared to history after Donelson;" but that is conjecture. Grant was one of the "singular few" who possessed qualities which probably would have gained for him a high place in history, no matter who had lived to compete with him in our great war.

No man was known by reputation, and personally, to so many men of his time as Grant. The nations of the earth read of him, saw him, and judged him. After the fame of his great deeds had spread over the world, he traveled through both hemispheres, and received the willing and unstinted homage of men high and low in various climes and countries. The record of what he has said and what he has done must place him high in the roll of the world's great men. Posterity will see to that. We who knew him face to face may bear witness to what he *was in himself*. We need not inquire to what extent he imbibed and assimilated the wisdom, the knowledge, or the morality of worthy parents, of early teachers, of friends and staff officers, such as McPherson, and Rawlins, and Wilson, and Bowers. Undoubtedly with him, as with other men, the surrounding influences of his life had much to do with making him what he was. He endured disappointment, humiliation, and poverty; he was tempted by military success and glory, and encountered the rivalries, the jealousies, the intrigues of ambitious and aspiring generals; he floated for years upon the high tide of popular favor and good fortune, and then fell through the evil of others, and was wrongfully and cruelly dashed against the rocks of financial discredit and ruin; and finally, while tried by prolonged and excruciating physical torture, he made an effort,

unsurpassed in its heroism, to restore the fortunes of his family by the work of his own brain and hand. What did the duties, the obligations, the temptations, the sorrows, the struggles of life, make of this man? One of the truest, strongest, bravest, human entities that the world has ever produced.

JAMES B. FRY.

A CHAPTER ON MONETARY POLICY.

In fulfilling the task confided to me of reviewing the "symposium" in the November number of The North American Review, entitled, "Shall Silver be Demonetized?" the reader will grant me indulgence if I waive detailed exposition of "Bimetallism." By so far presuming upon the publicity of my contributions to the doctrine and policy embodied in that word, I reserve space needed for the work of criticism. I am, withal, warranted in expecting on the part of the general reader of to-day a certain familiarity with the general nature and aim of that doctrine and policy.

I shall also take leave to sacrifice this occasion of criticising matters of detail; even where they invite refutations, as in the case of the rigid local quantity-theory which inspires Mr. Hill's views on the Volume of Money and Mr. Delmar's views on Demonetization. I thus reserve the space at my disposal for such a comprehensive view of monetary policy as shall indicate the extent and position of the circle of ideas to which Mr. Hill, Mr. Delmar, and Mr. Phillips have limited themselves.

A convenient text is offered me for reviewing their position, as a whole, by Mr. Hill's full and frank defining of representative views upon the international aspect of the Silver Question.

"Professor Walker, he says, favors the abrogation of the Silver Coinage law of 1878 upon the sole ground that a bimetallic arrangement with European nations is the indispensable condition to the safe use of silver in this country.

"*This is in plain contradiction of the experience of mankind.* From time immemorial both gold and silver have been used as money without bimetallic treaties. The relative value of gold and silver, disturbed for a time by the disproportionate yield of silver following the discovery of America, finally settled in 1650 to between 15 and 16 to 1, and so remained for 225 years, although the first case of an international arrangement, the Latin Union treaty, did not occur till 1865.

"The world *has had a long experience, independently of international treaties, of that steadiness of the relative value of the two metals which results from*

the magnitude of their mass, representing the accumulation of ages, which is so vastly in excess of their annual production.

"*No cause of equal magnitude*, tending to disturb the relative value of the metals, *as the transition of Germany from the single standard of silver to the single standard of gold, will probably recur for centuries. After that transition had spent its force*," etc., etc.

To the breadth of this historical survey, I desire to offer, in passing, a tribute of respect. Standing, as it does, in marked contrast to the narrowness of range unfortunately so prevalent, it is itself an ally in securing the detection of whatever defect of statement or error of conclusion it may embody or foster.

Such defect and error are, in fact, not far from the surface.

What is the most notable feature, from the point of view of monetary policy, in this long period, from 1650 to 1875, to which Mr. Hill calls attention?

What else but the substantial consensus of nations in bimetallic law?

The story of these 225 years is a story of concurrent legal tender, and concurrent in alternating coinage; a story of the Spanish and Portuguese ratios of 16; of the French ratios near 14.50; of the English ratio of 15.21; of the new French ratio of 15.50. This comparative stability to relative value between the two money metals which is exhibited for our praise, what was it but the concurrent laws of money-using nations which marshaled to its maintenance the self-interest of money-using men? Man's self-interest—the great fact of facts, the fundamental postulate of economic science—was directed to alternative demand by the governmental institution of the silver and gold standard: a demand for silver below and not above, a demand for gold below and not above, the rates established by the practice of governments; a demand which thus, though under crude and varying conditions, has, so to speak, automatically transferred from one metal to another, with the natural effect of supporting an equilibrium between them.

Now this concurrence of nations in the silver and gold standard presents the counterpart in embryo of that Bimetallic Union, to be made firm by contract, which was the aim of the policy of the Monetary Conferences.

Again, in the formation of the Latin Union, we can recognize a simple step forward in a normal process of development from

these beginnings of international concert in maintaining equilibrium between silver and gold. In a word, in the place of a crude and unconscious bimetallic union, we see a union which more properly deserves the name, a conscious and well-regulated Bimetallic Union.

The "experience of mankind," therefore, "for 225 years," is precisely an experience of a "bimetallic arrangement of European nations."

And the arrangement of which the United States made itself the promoter, by calling the Conference of 1878, is a continuation or renewal of this time-honored arrangement in such a form as conservatism and common sense demand; namely, a better arrangement than the world has yet enjoyed—a better union—a "more perfect union," to use the language employed by our fathers when, a century ago, they achieved an analogous advance in internal political organization, from the Confederation to the Constitution.

So much for the past! How stands it with Mr. Hill's perception of the present?

A phenomenon has occurred unique in history. Bimetallic free coinage, the balance-wheel of the mechanism of the valuations of the planet, is broken. That constitution of money upon which the history of Christendom has proceeded stands now subverted; to monetary peace succeeds monetary war.

And yet of all this Mr. Hill will have his readers hear nothing.

Pages for effects, but not a word for causes.

So much for the present! What of the future?

Mr. Hill speaks of the transition of Germany from silver to gold as having *spent its force*, and is of opinion that no equal cause of disturbance will probably occur for centuries.

Germany's transition!

But Germany, in 1879, interrupted that part of her transition which consisted in selling out her melted thalers. And it has "spent its force!"

Happy illusion! The early installments of it broke up the Bimetallic Union. The enormous stock of silver coin in the Western nations subsides to the precarious status of tokens; the gold is undergoing upheaval, each step of which is cumulative wrong; in a word, the world's metallic money has been forced into an insupportable posture of unstable equilibrium. If ever

this disastrous process now going on shall have been arrested; if order shall have been restored—that is to say, *if the policy of the Monetary Conferences shall have reaped the harvest of success*—then, at length, it will be possible to say that force has departed from Germany's transition.

But if the world shall consent to remain prisoner within the circle of ideas which Mr. Hill represents, then the centuries of which he speaks may tell their serial story of the unexhausted force of this "transition."

But enough.

We have sufficiently exposed the barrenness of the land.

No one will question that in scholarly acquirement as well as in practical experience, ex-Senator Hill, of Colorado, is well entitled to lead the section of opinion of which he allows himself to be the spokesman.

But opposition to an international bimetallist policy—in the camp of expansionists of any school—will be found to be inspired full as much by temper as by doctrine, and by temper which claims kinship to patriotism and to civic virtue.

It is almost instinctive with us, upon proper provocation, to set up a Monroe Doctrine which is equal to the occasion; and the mere foreignness of an international question, seeking to impose itself upon local national policy, excites a combativeness which veils the inexorable fact that there is no Monroe Doctrine which is equal to this occasion.

In this obscurity alone could it happen that the important special interests which have most to lose by the continued non-success of international bimetallism, most to gain by its success, namely, wheat and cotton, are represented by its most obstinate enemies. But agencies are at work to further a business view of the situation. The wheat interests of the Mississippi Valley take a business view of wheat; the cotton-growing States are not indifferent to the business aspects of cotton, *in some respects*. All look across the border to Liverpool or Manchester, and those who are far-sighted see Bombay beyond, and a vista of new Indian railways. There is no Monroe Doctrine here; no objection to dealing with things foreign and international as a matter of business.

Now, when the staples he exports depend for their price upon competing supply and employment in many nations, can any

practical man imagine that the metals in times of which these staples are paid for are not equally subject to international influences of competing supply and employment ?

Impossible !

So, if the wheat man thougthfully follows his wheat, and the cotton man his cotton, he will presently find when his returns come in that he is an "international bimetallist."

And it is high time that he should do so. The situation is critical. Either a decisive blow in the campaign of international Bimetallism is to be struck *now* by Congress, or a pitiful failure is to be made through which mighty interests of millions will suffer.

It is the latter policy, that of failure, of which Mr. Hill is an advocate, and which inspires his attack against an international monetary policy; the vital point with him being that the silver dollar coinage must not be stopped.

It will therefore complete our circuit of review of this portion of the anti-bimetallist camp, if I set forth the grounds why, as a Bimetallist, I desire the cessation of silver coinage in this country.

As for the reasons, domestic and internal, which make such cessations now a necessity, space precludes my entering upon them here.

As for the form of the law which should be passed (at once, under suspension of the rules), a conservative measure would fix a date in the near future for cessation of purchase of bullion and coinage of dollars, though, barring constitutional questions, the same date need not be fixed for both. It would also seem politic to provide for the removal of the limit in case Europe should offer proper co-operation in coining new silver. In justice to all sides, it is proper, before passing to the main task in hand, to maintain here certain other important duties which are incumbent upon the country in connection with silver.

The formation of an International Monetary Union demands more of the United States than cordial concurrence. This is not enough. The initiation in bringing about such a union, which the United States assumed by the conferences, should not be abandoned. This does not necessarily imply new conferences; indeed, the time would seem to be past for further diplomatic assemblies for public academic debate on this question.

But the object in view is a contract, or concerted action equivalent to contract, between the sovereigns who in unions can swing the par of the money metals. Now the definition of a contract imports *aggregatio mentium*—a "meeting of minds." Those sovereigns, whether emperor, king, or president, are not likely to sign a contract except upon advice of their various privy councilors, except in diplomacy and science. A confidential mutual understanding, therefore, between the confidential counselors of the various governments—a "meeting of minds" on their part, in their various languages—is the counterpart for the international task of the "meeting of minds" of buyer and seller in a contract of bargain and sale. We note therefore, in passing, without detail, but clearly, that whatever action—whether it be in legislatures or in cabinets, in department affairs or elsewhere—proves necessary in order to bring about this confidential mutual understanding, is a condition precedent to setting in motion the august machinery of treaty-making or of concurrent legislation, and therefore an essential part of the duties of the time.

Stoppage of silver coinage as a plank in the platform of the Bimetallic Union justifies itself at once when the character and extent of the antisilver movement is fully understood.

The movement to proscribe silver drew its chief inspiration from four sources:

1. The economic dogma of unity of standard.
2. The aspiration for unification of coinage.
3. The desire to avert a general depreciation of money (rise of prices).
4. The example of England.

In Germany, a political interest gave an electric impetus to the movement; a new gold money, replacing and obliterating the sectionalism of a silver past, was a natural crowning of the edifice for the new-made empire, giving in fullest measure to the new Cæsar the things that were Cæsar's.

But this proposition to recoin French napoleons into German Williams *d'or*, and to sell out the German stock of silver to be coined into French dollars, was hardly welcome to France, the center and support of the great Bimetallic Union, which had been steadying the par of the metals for the world's benefit.

The monetary assault of the Teutonic Empire upon the Latin treasure was therefore countered with rapidity. No sooner

did the retirement of German silver begin, than the Latin Union put up the bars (January 30, 1874) by limiting coinage; a practice followed, in 1878, by total suspension. Holland shut her door in 1875. France did not coin her quota of silver; she took five million dollars' worth of new silver in 1876, and that was the last.

And so the Bimetallic Union was dissolved. This momentous event was plainly due to the enforcement of dogma by passion.

In its origin an idea, doctrinaire, artificial, impractical, unsound, the antisilver movement had been reinforced by powers well-nigh inarrestible, by habit in England, by national pride in Germany and in France.

For who, in 1885, can see that its strength is not yet wholly spent, can recognize that it was a movement tidal in its force? It was clear that in any event the re-establishment of a Bimetallic Union must take time; the practical inertia of governments, the dogmatic opposition and the mental inertia of their monetary privy councilors, the mere momentum of a movement, such as I have described it, could only be overcome by a process analogous to the erosion of continents with which physical geography has to deal.

Such was, in brief, the diplomatic situation when the United States called the Conference of 1878.

That the duty of assuming this initiation lay upon the United States is obvious.

What other nation could assume it, or would assume it?

There was Holland; Bimetallist to the core, as she is to-day, with none but skilled labor on guard. But Holland was a minor power; perhaps she was too conscious of it—but the task seemed beyond her strength.

The question of the time was, "What would the United States do—this young Giant of the West, this great Paper-money Power across the Atlantic, which proposed to take unto itself its share of specie?" Evidently the casting vote to determine what specie should be lay in its hands. What would it do?

A question, to answer which the European statesmen could gain but a vague forecast.

In such a situation the work of the Conference was well marked; it forced the governments of Europe to realize their situation, to examine their interests from the international stand-point; and it was a unique occasion and means of advancing the study of mon-

etary policy in preparation for the performance of the novel duty thrown upon the nations in this age, the conscious regulation of the parity of silver and gold.

But the mission of the Conference was also to impress Europe with the attitude of the transatlantic power which convoked it.

Candor compels our recognition that, to a European thinker who knew the monetary past of the United States, there was much to encourage the belief that Europe might in the end—*if she waited long enough*—melt down her silver coin and sell it out to the Americans at a good gold price.

The vista of State bank issues before the war; the failure to keep our money at par during the war, or to bring it back to par soon after the war; the strenuous agitation in favor of immediate free coinage when it must facilitate demonetization in Germany, an agitation sanctioned by the report of a commission; the redundant coinage of silver change since 1873 and in 1878; the new coinage of silver dollars—everything pointed in the one direction we have described.

And, of course, the chance of selling out silver to America was calculated to stifle in Europe the dispositions which alone could promise success to the policy of the Conference.

Bluntly stated, therefore, the task for European monetary diplomacy was, "how to maneuver the United States out of its adhesion to the policy of Bimetallic Union, and into the scheme of coining silver without limit all alone."

That the coinage of standard dollars was, from the purely diplomatic stand-point, a mistake, is an obvious conclusion.

What was true in 1878 is true to-day. In all the years that have followed, the perspective offered to Europe, that the United States without concurrent coinage in Europe would continue to relieve the situation by coining two millions, or four millions, or *more* millions a month, has been a drag upon the advancement of bimetallic policy.

The Conference of 1881 offered a distinct advance toward the end. The attitude of the United States, as defined in the Conference of 1878, had inaugurated a period of reflection, the progress of which was revealed as with an electric flash by the stoppage of sales of demonetized German silver, May 16, 1877.

Germany, who had declined all participation in the Conference of 1878, was now ready for concessions, among which was an en-

gagement not to sell silver. England was ready to offer free coinage of silver and exclusion of gold in India, and a limited issue of Bank of England notes on silver deposit in England.

But the object of these concessions was avowedly to induce the other Powers to inaugurate free coinage.

Unimportant in practice as the concessions of Germany and England might appear, they infallibly operated as an admission of the great point of controversy, the truth of bimetallist doctrine: it was admittedly, then, the interest of England and of Germany to further the re-enfranchisement of silver.

In this situation it seemed that the Conference could properly report progress and act for further time. This was done. An adjournment for consultation and negotiation between governments was agreed upon, and April 12, 1882, fixed for the adjourned session. But the work of doctrinal diplomacy thus imposed upon governments was crossed and made unfruitful by a series of political events, involving changes of succession in the governments which had called the Conference: the short reign and downfall of the Gambetta ministry in France, and in this country the agony and death of Garfield and the transfer of power from Mr. Blaine to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

The course decided upon by the governments of France and the United States, upon consultation with the various governments, was set forth in an identical note, sent March 31, 1882, to the powers which had taken part in the Conference, "deferring its convocation, subject to a determination, on the part of the states interested, of the date for its reassembling, the same to take place within the present year."

Various schemes of concurrent action had been under discussion, of which some fell short of the concurrent free coinage held in view by Congress; for example, a union for limited coinage, each nation to coin a quota, and a union for concurrent withdrawal of small gold coin and small notes.

In the mean time an active propaganda had been set on foot in England and in Germany, the two countries where further enlightenment of public opinion was especially needed. But the long session of Congress (1882) having passed by without any action fixing a limit of time for the dollar coinage, the states interested in the success of the policy of the Conferences profited by the opportunity to let things drift.

And drifting is the course which still is followed while the dollar coinage goes on. Meantime, Italy has succeeded in gathering a gold fund to keep her paper at or near par, and Holland has acted upon the advice of her Bimetallist leaders, and prepared herself to take in sail if the wind should rise, by a law allowing the Bank to melt and sell silver in order to maintain its gold reserve.

A new phenomenon, the competition of India in wheat, and to some extent in cotton, at a low silver price, translated for gold countries into an artificially lower gold price, has invaded the monetary peace of Christendom—not merely with amounts imported, but through the specific draw on prices of a great potential supply—and so contributes a novel quota to the general subsidence of prices in occidental money.

Evidences are accumulating that sensitiveness is replacing inertia in tone-giving quarters.

On the 6th of March, 1885, a strong bimetallist resolution was the subject of exhaustive debate in the German Reichstag. The motion was defeated, but without giving an index of the opinions of the House, the anti-bimetallists being supported by the vote and not the speeches of the clericals, who acted in a body; while their leader, Windthorst, in stating their positions, distinctly disavowed committing himself against a bimetallist policy, but based the action of his party solely upon their view of the respective functions of the House and of the government, the initiative and responsibility in this matter belonging to the latter.

In the French Chamber, the monetary question came up on March 8, in connection with the tariff on wheat, and was the subject of debate, the chief speaker, M. de Soubeyran, maintaining, among other things, that the defeat of the resolution in the Reichstag two days before was due to the fact that it was felt that the initiative in the matter of further negotiations really belonged to France and the United States.

At the request of the Finance Minister, the matter was not pressed.

A query arises from these incidents which is full of suggestion, namely, what action might have been taken in Berlin and in Paris, if the Congress which came to an end March 4, 1885, had passed the Coinage Bill reported in January by the Senate Finance Committee.

The appointment of a royal commission in England to investigate the causes of trade depression, the announcement in official quarters in Berlin that the question of the double standard is under consideration, the decided expressions of the Bankers' Union of Paris and the provinces, are later signs that the leaven of reform is working.

Significant, too, in another direction, are the echoes of the discussion of the Warner Bill—notably, articles in a Hamburg paper, in July, from the hand of Professor Soetbeer, the intellectual author of "Silver Outlawry in Germany," in which he makes the naïve observation that European nations have no reason to feel any concern as to the adoption of this compromise in the United States, but that, on the contrary, it is a consummation rather to be wished by *those nations which have silver to sell.*

What, then, is the situation revealed by this survey of the field?

A vicious circle: nations watching each other, sensitive and expectant, all waiting for the United States to act.

And who are they who say that the United States shall not act—act to force an international settlement of the silver question, act in furtherance of the policy which alone offers monetary honor and monetary peace?

The chief obstructionists are they who are in subjection to the errors we have passed in review.

S. DANA HORTON.

THE CAPTURE OF JOHN BROWN.

At noon of Monday, October 18, 1859, Chief Clerk Walsh, of the Navy Department, drove rapidly into the Washington Navy-yard, and, meeting me, asked me how many marines we had stationed at the barracks available for immediate duty. I happened to be the senior officer present and in command that day. I instantly replied to Mr. Walsh that we had ninety men available, and then asked him what was the trouble. He told me that Ossawatomie Brown, of Kansas, with a number of men, had taken the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and was then besieged there by the Virginia State troops. Mr. Walsh returned speedily to the Navy Department building, and, in the course of an hour, orders came to me from Secretary Tousey to proceed at once to Harper's Ferry and report to the senior officer; and, if there should be no such officer at the Ferry, to take charge and protect the government property. With a detachment of ninety marines, I started for Harper's Ferry that afternoon on the 3:30 train, taking with me two howitzers. It was a beautiful, clear autumn day, and the men, exhilarated by the excitement of the occasion, which came after a long, dull season of confinement in the barracks, enjoyed the trip exceedingly.

At Frederick Junction I received a dispatch from Colonel Robert E. Lee, who turned out to be the army officer to whom I was to report. He directed me to proceed to Sandy Hook, a small place about a mile this side of the Ferry, and there await his arrival. At ten o'clock in the evening he came up on a special train from Washington. His first order was to form the marines out of the car, and march from the bridge to Harper's Ferry. This we did, entering the inclosure of the arsenal grounds through a back gate. At eleven o'clock Colonel Lee ordered the volunteers to march out of the grounds, and gave the control inside to the marines, with instructions to see that none of the insurgents escaped during the night. There had been hard fighting all the preceding day, and

Brown and his men kept quiet during the night. At half-past six in the morning Colonel Lee gave me orders to select a detail of twelve men for a storming party, and place them near the engine-house in which Brown and his men had intrenched themselves. I selected twelve of my best men, and a second twelve to be employed as a reserve. The engine-house was a strong stone building, which is still in a good state of preservation at the Ferry, in spite of the three days' fighting in the building by Brown and his men, and the ravages of the recent war between the States. The building was of stone, perhaps thirty feet by thirty-five. In the front were two large double doors, between which was a stone abutment. Within were two old-fashioned, heavy fire-engines, with a hose-cart and reel standing between them, and just back of the abutment between the doors. They were double-battened doors, very strongly made, with heavy wrought-iron nails. Lieutenant J. E. B. Stewart, afterwards famous as a cavalry commander on the side of the South, accompanied Colonel Lee as a volunteer aid. He was ordered to go with a part of the troops to the front of the engine-house and demand the surrender of the insurgent party. Colonel Lee directed him to offer protection to Brown and his men, but to receive no counter-proposition from Brown in regard to the surrender. On the way to the engine-house, Stewart and myself agreed upon a signal for attack in the event that Brown should refuse to surrender. It was simply that Lieutenant Stewart would wave his hat, which was then, I believe, one very similar to the famous chapeau which he wore throughout the war. I had my storming party ranged alongside of the engine-house, and a number of men were provided with sledge-hammers with which to batter in the doors. I stood in front of the abutment between the doors. Stewart hailed Brown and called for his surrender, but Brown at once began to make a proposition that he and his men should be allowed to come out of the engine-house and be given the length of the bridge start, so that they might escape. Suddenly Lieutenant Stewart waved his hat, and I gave the order to my men to batter in the door. Those inside fired rapidly at the point where the blows were given upon the door. Very little impression was made with the hammers, as the doors were tied on the inside with ropes and braced by the hand-brakes of the fire-engines, and in a few minutes I gave the order to desist. Just then my eye caught sight of a ladder, lying a few feet from the

engine-house, in the yard, and I ordered my men to catch it up and use it as a battering-ram. The reserve of twelve men I employed as a supporting column for the assaulting party. The men took hold bravely and made a tremendous assault upon the door. The second blow broke it in. This entrance was a ragged hole low down in the right-hand door, the door being splintered and cracked some distance upward. I instantly stepped from my position in front of the stone abutment, and entered the opening made by the ladder. At the time I did not stop to think of it, but upon reflection I should say that Brown had just emptied his carbine at the point broken by the ladder, and so I passed in safely. Getting to my feet, I ran to the right of the engine which stood behind the door, passed quickly to the rear of the house, and came up between the two engines. The first person I saw was Colonel Lewis Washington, who was standing near the hose-cart, at the front of the engine-house. On one knee, a few feet to the left, knelt a man with a carbine in his hand, just pulling the lever to reload.

"Hello, Green," said Colonel Washington, and he reached out his hand to me. I grasped it with my left hand, having my saber uplifted in my right, and he said, pointing to the kneeling figure, "This is Ossawatomie."

As he said this, Brown turned his head to see who it was to whom Colonel Washington was speaking. Quicker than thought I brought my saber down with all my strength upon his head. He was moving as the blow fell, and I suppose I did not strike him where I intended, for he received a deep saber cut in the back of the neck. He fell senseless on his side, then rolled over on his back. He had in his hand a short Sharpe's-cavalry carbine. I think he had just fired as I reached Colonel Washington, for the marine who followed me into the aperture made by the ladder received a bullet in the abdomen, from which he died in a few minutes. The shot might have been fired by some one else in the insurgent party, but I think it was from Brown. Instinctively as Brown fell I gave him a saber thrust in the left breast. The sword I carried was a light uniform weapon, and, either not having a point or striking something hard in Brown's accouterments, did not penetrate. The blade bent double.

By that time three or four of my men were inside. They came rushing in like tigers, as a storming assault is not a play-day sport.

They bayoneted one man skulking under the engine, and pinned another fellow up against the rear wall, both being instantly killed. I ordered the men to spill no more blood. The other insurgents were at once taken under arrest, and the contest ended. The whole fight had not lasted over three minutes. My only thought was to capture, or, if necessary, kill, the insurgents, and take possession of the engine-house.

I saw very little of the situation within until the fight was over. Then I observed that the engine-house was thick with smoke, and it was with difficulty that a person could be seen across the room. In the rear, behind the left-hand engine, were huddled the prisoners whom Brown had captured and held as hostages for the safety of himself and his men. Colonel Washington was one of these. All during the fight, as I understood afterward, he kept to the front of the engine-house. When I met him he was as cool as he would have been on his own veranda entertaining guests. He was naturally a very brave man. I remember that he would not come out of the engine-house, begrimed and soiled as he was from his long imprisonment, until he had put a pair of kid gloves upon his hands. The other prisoners were the sorriest lot of people I ever saw. They had been without food for over sixty hours, in constant dread of being shot, and were huddled up in the corner where lay the body of Brown's son and one or two others of the insurgents who had been killed. Some of them have endeavored to give an account of the storming of the engine-house and the capture of Brown, but none of the reports have been free from a great many misstatements, and I suppose that Colonel Washington and myself were the only persons really able to say what was done. Other stories have been printed by people on the outside, describing the fight within. What they say must be taken with a great deal of allowance, for they could not have been witnesses of what occurred within the engine-house. One recent account describes me as jumping over the right-hand engine more like a wild beast than a soldier. Of course nothing of the kind happened. The report made by Colonel Lee at the time, which is now on file in the War Department, gives a more succinct and detailed account than any I have seen.

I can see Colonel Lee now, as he stood on a slight elevation, about forty feet from the engine-house, during the assault. He was in civilian dress, and looked then very little as he did during

the war. He wore no beard, except a dark mustache, and his hair was slightly gray. He had no arms upon his person, and treated the affair as one of no very great consequence, which would be speedily settled by the marines. A part of the scene, giving color and life to the picture, was the bright blue uniform of the marines. They wore blue trousers then, as they do now, and a dark blue frock-coat. Their belts were white, and they wore French fatigue caps. I do not remember the names of the twelve men in the storming party, nor can I tell what became of them in later life. We had no use for the howitzers, and, in fact, they were not taken from the car.

Immediately after the fight, Brown was carried out of the engine-house, and recovered consciousness while lying on the ground in front. A detail of men carried him up to the paymaster's office, where he was attended to and his wants supplied. On the following day, Wednesday, with an escort, I removed him to Charleston, and turned him over to the civil authorities. No handcuffs were placed upon him, and he supported himself with a self-reliance and independence which were characteristic of the man. He had recovered a great deal from the effects of the blow from my saber, the injury of which was principally the shock, as he only received a flesh wound. I had little conversation with him, and spent very little time with him.

I have often been asked to describe Brown's appearance at the instant he lifted his head to see who was talking with Colonel Washington. It would be impossible for me to do so. The whole scene passed so rapidly that it hardly made a distinct impression upon my mind. I can only recall the fleeting picture of an old man kneeling with a carbine in his hand, with a long gray beard falling away from his face, looking quickly and keenly toward the danger that he was aware had come upon him. He was not a large man, being perhaps five feet ten inches when he straightened up in full. His dress, even, I do not remember distinctly. I should say that he had his trousers tucked in his boots, and that he wore clothes of gray—probably no more than trousers and shirt. I think he had no hat upon his head.

None of the prisoners were hurt. They were badly frightened and somewhat starved. I received no wounds except a slight scratch on one hand as I was getting through the hole in the door. Colonel Lee and the people on the outside thought I was wounded.

Brown had, at the time, only five or six fighting men, and I think he himself was the only one who showed fight after I entered the engine-house. There were no provisions in the building, and it would have been only a question of time when Brown would have had to surrender. Colonel Washington was the only person inside the house that I knew.

I have been asked what became of Brown's carbine. That I do not know. My sword was left in Washington, among people with whom I lived, and I lost trace of it. A few years ago, after having come out of the war and gone west to Dakota, where I now live, I received a letter from a gentleman in Washington, saying that he knew where the sword was, and that it was still bent double, as it was left by the thrust upon Brown's breast. He said that it was now a relic of great historic value, and asked me to assent to the selling of it upon the condition that I should receive a portion of the price of the weapon. To me the matter had very little interest, and I replied indifferently. Since then I have heard nothing of the matter. I presume the saber could be found somewhere in Washington.

ISRAEL GREEN.

JOHNSON'S PLOT AND MOTIVES.

THE 29th day of May, 1865, President Johnson issued a proclamation for the reorganization of the State of North Carolina. By that proclamation William W. Holden was appointed provisional governor, and it was made his duty at the earliest practicable period to prescribe such rules and regulations as might be necessary and proper for the election of delegates to a convention that should be competent to alter or amend the constitution of the State, and to do whatever might be necessary to enable the loyal citizens to restore the State to its constitutional relations to the Federal Government, and to present such a Republican form of State government as would entitle the State to the guarantee of the United States. The voters were required to take and subscribe the oath prescribed by the proclamation of amnesty of the same date. The officers of the army and the navy were required to aid the governor in the performance of the duty imposed upon him.

The proclamation assumed that the work of reconstruction was in the hands of the President alone. The 39th Congress could not meet until December. It was possible for the President to complete the work of reconstruction before the judgment of Congress or of the country could be obtained.

After an examination of the document, my apprehensions were such that I made a visit to Washington for the purpose of conferring with the President, and of offering such suggestions as then occurred to me, and which I hoped might change his policy. At the interview I stated my objections to the proclamation. He said in reply that the step was experimental; that North Carolina was his native State; and that he had a wish to see the State restored to the Union at an early moment. At the end he assured me that no other State would be reorganized until the experiment in North Carolina had been tested. Upon this assurance I was in a degree satisfied, saying, however, as I was leaving, that a continuance of the policy would end in the division of the Republican Party.

I did not then realize that my closing observation was an encouragement to the President to pursue the policy against which I was protesting. This was afterward made to appear by the testimony of the Hon. Stanley Matthews.

The first day of July, 1867, Stanley Matthews, now a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, was examined by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives.

As a part of his testimony he said: "I had an interview with Mr. Johnson in February, 1865, at the Burnett House, in Cincinnati, where he was stopping on his way to Washington to be inaugurated as Vice-President. I called upon him, having been one of the electors of President and Vice-President, to pay my respects to him, and I had some conversation with him at that time upon public affairs. The earlier part of the conversation had reference to some personal matters growing out of our relations when I was in Nashville as provost-marshal. After they had been disposed of in conversation, I inquired as to the state of public feeling on political matters in Tennessee at that time. He remarked that very great changes had taken place since I had been there; that many of those who at first were the best Union men had turned to be the worst rebels, and that many of those who had originally been the worst rebels were now the best Union men. I expressed surprise and regret at what he said in reference to the matter. We were sitting near each other on the sofa. He then turned to me and said: 'You and I were old Democrats.' I said 'Yes.' He then said: 'I will tell you what it is, if the country is ever to be saved, it is to be done through the old Democratic Party.' I do not know whether I made any reply to that, or, if I did, what it was; and immediately afterward I took my leave." ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 781.)

This avowal by Mr. Johnson is the key to the whole of his subsequent political career. Although he had been appointed military governor of Tennessee by a Republican President, and although he was then on his way to Washington to take the second highest office in the nation at the hands of the Republican Party, he had no hope for the salvation of the country except by the agency of the old Democratic Party.

That avowal explains the proclamation of the 29th of May, for the reorganization of the State of North Carolina, which opened the way for the return of the old Democratic Party to power in the

government of the United States. It explains the proclamation of the 13th of June, 1865, for the reorganization of the State of Mississippi—a State which had no claim to special consideration at the hands of the Republican Party, of which Mr. Johnson was then the recognized head.

It explains the several proclamations, all bearing date as early as July 13, 1865, by which provisional governors were appointed for Georgia, for Texas, for Alabama, for South Carolina, for Florida; and authority was given for the erection of a State government in each. It explains also the unnecessary declaration in the proclamation of the 2d of April, 1866, that the States then recently in rebellion were still States of the American Union, and by the Constitution and laws of the United States were "made equals, and placed upon a like footing as to political rights, immunities, dignity, and power, with the several States with which they are united."

It explains his separation from the Republican Party, which then, indeed, he had in opinion, and probably in purpose, abandoned, and at a moment when no controversy with its leaders had arisen, and at a moment when he was accepting its highest honors.

The avowal made to Judge Matthews casts reasonable doubt upon the sincerity of all Mr. Johnson's subsequent declarations in which he denounced traitors and treason as odious, and it prepares the ordinary human mind to accept as truthful the statements attributed to General Grant, touching the events and incidents of his relations to President Johnson in the autumn of 1866.

Upon my arrival in Washington to attend the session of Congress which began December 3, 1866, I received a letter from Mr. Stanton, asking me to call at the War Department at the earliest moment possible. I called without delay. He directed me to his private room, where he soon joined me.

Without preface he said: "I am more concerned for the fate of the country than I was at any time during the war." His exact words further I cannot recall, but he gave me to understand that the President had issued orders to officers of the army, of which neither he nor General Grant had knowledge, and that there was danger that General Grant would be sent away from Washington. He spoke of an article I had published in the October number of the "Atlantic Monthly," and said that it had disturbed the President, but that the scheme for the reorganization of Congress was

not abandoned. He did not allude to the attempt to send General Grant to Mexico, nor did he refer to General Sherman, unless the remark about orders related to the order to Sherman to report in Washington.

At the request of Mr. Stanton, I wrote at his dictation the substance of what afterward became the second section of the Army Appropriation Act, approved March 2, 1867.

In that section it was provided that the head-quarters of the General of the Army should be at the city of Washington, and that he should not be detailed for service elsewhere except at his own request or by the previous approval of the Senate; that all orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War should be issued through the General of the Army, or in case of his disability, through the officer next in command; and, finally, that all orders issued in any other manner should be null and void, and that the officer issuing such orders, and all officers who might obey them, knowing that they had been issued in any other manner, should be alike guilty of a misdemeanor.

I submitted a fair copy of this paper to Mr. Stevens, then Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and repeated to him in substance the conversation that I had had with Mr. Stanton. We had some conversation upon the constitutional questions that occurred to us, and also upon the mode of proceeding, whether by a separate bill or by its incorporation as a section in the Army Appropriation Bill.

The provision was inserted in the Army Bill, and in that bill it passed the House after some debate which did not relate directly to the merits of the measure. I took the precaution to communicate to Mr. Fessenden, then the Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, the substance of my conversation with Mr. Stanton.

The debate in the Senate was limited to amendments proposed which did not extend to the merits of the bill. Mr. Stevens reported the Army Appropriation Bill the 5th day of February, and at that time, if not at an earlier date, President Johnson had knowledge of the purpose to limit his authority as commander of the army, and he could not have been ignorant of the events in which the purpose originated.

At that time I had not had any conversations with General Grant touching his relations with President Johnson. While Gen-

eral Grant was President, I had many conversations with him, and, as he detailed his interviews with President Johnson, I was able to understand the causes which induced Mr. Stanton to advise and urge the passage of the act of March 2, 1867.

General Grant's statement to me was this: That on an occasion, which I understood to have been in the year 1866, summer or early autumn, Johnson said to him, "If I should have trouble with Congress, which side should you support?" to which Grant said, "That would depend upon which side the law was."

President Johnson may have interpreted this remark as equivalent to a declaration by the General of the Army that he should support the Congress composed of members from the loyal States exclusively, until governments should have been organized in the South in conformity to acts passed by the Congress composed only of men from the loyal States. It was in fact, however, a declaration that he should obey the laws and Constitution of the country. General Grant's opinion in July, 1867, is fully proved by his testimony taken by the Judiciary Committee.

Speaking of the North Carolina proclamation, and giving his opinion of it at the time it was issued, he said: "I looked upon it simply as a temporary measure, to establish a sort of government until Congress should meet and settle the whole question." ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 834.)

General Grant was not ignorant of President Johnson's opinions concerning the legality of the 39th Congress. In his testimony (p. 832) he said, speaking of Johnson, "I have heard him say—and I think I have heard him say it twice in his speeches—that if the North carried the elections by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, a majority, why would they not be the Congress of the United States? I have heard him say that several times. . . . I mean, if the North carried enough members in favor of the admission of the South."

There cannot be a reasonable doubt that President Johnson made a serious and persistent attempt, in the autumn of 1866, to send General Grant to Mexico; and it is equally certain that the most thorough knowledge of our relations with that country fails to disclose any sufficient and honorable reason for the undertaking.

After the election of General Grant to the Presidency, he gave me an account of his interviews with President Johnson, in refer-

ence to the project of sending the General to Mexico in the autumn of 1866. It was, in substance, this: "At a casual meeting the President said, 'I may have occasion to ask you to go to Mexico.' I said, in reply, 'I am so situated that it will not be convenient for me to leave.' Not many days after this conversation the President sent for me to come to his office. Upon my arrival I found Mr. Seward and the President. Mr. Seward opened his portfolio, and read a long paper addressed to me, and containing instructions for my guidance in Mexico. The instructions referred to many matters, more indefinite, and at the end he came out at the same hole he went in at. When Mr. Seward had concluded, I said to the President, 'You know I told you that it would not be convenient for me to go to Mexico.' The President then began to argue with me, and to urge. I as steadily resisted his arguments. The President grew warm; and finally, rising from his chair and striking his table violently with his fist, he said, 'I would like to know if there is an officer of the army who will not obey my orders!' I rose, took my hat in my hand, and said, 'I am an officer of the army, but I am a citizen also. The service you ask me to perform is a civil service, and, as a citizen, I may accept it or decline it, and I decline it.' I then left the room."

The distinction thus made by General Grant left to the President authority to assign him to duty as a soldier at any point within the United States that the President might select, and hence the solicitude of Mr. Stanton for the passage of the section in the Army Bill of the 2d of March, 1867.

Certain facts in Mr. Johnson's career are established upon proofs that would be satisfactory to judges and juries when dealing with the ordinary affairs of men.

(1.) The attempt to destroy the Union having been overcome, Mr. Johnson did not sympathize with the leaders of the Republican Party nor believe in its principles.

(2.) He entertained the opinion, common to the Democratic Party, that, upon the suppression of the rebellion, the States that had been engaged in it were still States of the American Union; and, as such States, that they were entitled, through the agency of the loyal citizens in each, to immediate and unconditional representation in the Congress of the United States.

(3.) Consequently, he entertained the opinion that the 39th

and 40th Congresses were illegal assemblages, and that their acts were void, or, at least, were voidable.

(4.) As set forth in his avowal to Judge Matthews, he was a believer in the policy of "the old Democratic Party;" consequently, when the war was ended and the attempt to destroy the Union had failed, there was no obstacle of opinion or of policy separating, or tending to separate, Mr. Johnson from "the old Democratic Party."

If it be assumed that these propositions concerning the opinion of Mr. Johnson are established by trustworthy evidence, we shall then, consequently, find him in such a state of mind in the year 1865, that he might have justified himself to himself in the adoption of the policy which he attempted in regard to the reconstruction of the Union.

General Grant was then in command of the army, with his head-quarters in Washington. He was then fresh from a series of victories covering a period of three years, and never marred by a single defeat. A million men had recognized him as their leader and chief.

The country regarded him as the restorer of the Union. The Republican Party, with few exceptions, supported the policy of Congress.

Any attempt to resist or reverse that policy must end in a disastrous failure, unless General Grant could be conciliated or exiled. There can be no reasonable doubt that President Johnson attempted first to reconcile General Grant to his policy, and, failing in that, he then attempted to send him out of the country.

We are not left in doubt as to Mr. Johnson's opinions upon the questions in controversy in 1865 and 1866; but whether he had a fixed resolution as to his own conduct in the premises is not so clear. In his opinions he was fixed to obstinacy; but his actions were often spasmodic and erratic.

In many forms of speech he asserted the rights of senators and representatives chosen in the rebel States under the provisional governments which he had set up; but it is not clear that he had a fixed and continuing resolution to recognize a Congress composed of those senators and representatives combined with duly elected Democratic senators and representatives from the North, and to defend such a Congress by force. The project, however, must have been in his mind, and there may have been moments

when he entertained the thought of attempting its execution. With Mr. Johnson, courage was a passion and not a habit of life.

Hence he was likely to form resolutions which he had no continuing ability to execute.

There is a chapter in Mr. Johnson's history remote from the subject of this inquiry at the beginning, but which at the end may have had a relation to the project for the reorganization of Congress.

In 1862, Mr. Johnson was military governor of Tennessee, and J. S. Fowler, afterward a Senator from the State of Tennessee, held the office of comptroller. During the summer of that year General Buell was forced back upon Louisville, and all regular communication between Nashville and the Ohio River was interrupted. There were troops at Nashville who had not been paid. Many of them were from the vicinity of Nashville, and their families were in want of the means of living.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Fowler went to the Planters' Bank and the Union Bank, and obtained a loan of forty thousand dollars, twenty thousand from each, for which they signed two notes, or drafts, of twenty thousand dollars each. The money of these banks was then at twenty or twenty-five per cent. discount. Of the sum so obtained, about thirty-four thousand dollars were paid out at par to the soldiers, and upon the usual pay-rolls. The remainder was used in the hospitals.

When communications were opened, the pay-rolls were sent to Washington, and in due time Mr. Johnson received a draft for the payments that had been made to the soldiers. Mr. Fowler was reimbursed for the hospital expenditures, and that money he placed in Mr. Johnson's hands. The government was then receiving money on deposit and allowing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum. At the request of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Fowler took the money to Cincinnati, deposited it in the United States depository, and received therefor four certificates of $10,000 each, and all in the name of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Fowler said: "Then of course he was to meet those notes. I was very much pressed afterward to pay the notes, and annoyed in reference to them. I presented the matter to Governor Johnson after he became acting President of the United States, and what was done in regard to it I do not know personally. The last time I called his attention to it he remarked, 'Let them call on me, and I will attend to it,'

or words to that effect." ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 176.)

The Planters' Bank failed, was put into the hands of receivers, and a Mr. Michael Burns, a friend of President Johnson, was designated as agent, with authority to arrange for the payment of the notes. Mr. Burns was examined in February, 1867. He stated that he had an interview with the President in the preceding November. At that interview the President said that he would like to have the notes arranged; that he did not get much value from them; that he paid the money to the troops and got a good deal of cursing because it was a depreciated currency. ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 164.)

The statement of Burns was this: "After he became President the parties became clamorous for their money. He said he thought they should not demand the money from him in full. He then asked them to compromise it, and he thought they ought to take $10,000 each. The banks sent on a Mr. White to arrange the matter. Mr. White returned with an offer from the President of $10,000 each. I told the President, when he mentioned the matter to me in the latter part of 1866, that I thought the banks would not take that offer, and that he should offer more. I telegraphed early in January, 1867, to him, that the Union Bank claim could be settled for $15,000. He acceded to this proposition. . . . When I went to make the arrangements with the bank they would not take less than $16,250. I got fretted about it, and in order to be rid of it, having told him I could settle it for $15,000, I gave a check on my own private account in the bank for the $1,250. . . ." The claim of the Planters' Bank had been previously paid by him.

"They took $14,600. The reason he claimed a compromise was that when he got the money the currency of the bank was about twenty per cent. below par." ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 1147.)

"The money paid to the Planters' Bank was the proceeds of twenty Tennessee bonds, then worth about seventy-two or seventy-three per cent. of their par." ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 1148.)

President Johnson kept an account with the First National Bank, Washington. The cashier, W. S. Huntington, was examined by the Judiciary Committee, March 30, 1867. When that account was opened he placed in the bank certificates of de-

posit issued by the assistant treasurer at Cincinnati, to the amount, as Mr. Huntington thought, of $50,000. These certificates were collected by the bank, and $48,000 of the proceeds were invested in United States seven-thirty bonds. The bonds were of the par value of $50,000, as their market value was then less than par. An additional purchase of bonds to the amount of $10,000 was subsequently made.

Finally, all these bonds were sold, and the proceeds, amounting to $64,947, were placed to Mr. Johnson's credit under date of December 15, 1866. ("Impeachment Investigation," p. 181.)

The balance to the credit of President Johnson, at the First National Bank, March 28, 1867, was $57,302.27, showing that the sale of the seven-thirty bonds had not been for the purpose of changing the investment. Mr. Huntington testified that he made a suggestion to the President "that he had better sell them, as the price was pretty good."

This chapter in Mr. Johnson's history does not justify the conclusion that the sale of bonds was due to any plan or purpose that might disturb the credit of the country, or lead him to the thought that it might be convenient to have at command a considerable sum of ready money. It is a legal conclusion from the evidence that the transaction was a financial one, solely; but the circumstances, that the sale was made in December, 1866, and that the money lay in bank unused for more than a hundred days, may lead some minds to an opposite conclusion.

GEO. S. BOUTWELL.

THE MISTAKES OF GRANT.

In a recent interview with the editor of the North American Review, my attention was called to the article in the November number of the "Century," page 128 *et seq.*, and I was asked in the interests of history to prepare some observations upon the matters therein set forth. I said there were very serious objections to a compliance with his request; that time and my occupations precluded the preparation of an historical article; that the time was inopportune, on account of the recent death of the author of the "Century" article, the state of the public mind, created by sympathies his death had excited, and because of the existence of strong partisan biases and partisan interests that lived and fed upon the illusions which had been created in the past. It was urged by the editor that errors in history were pernicious, and that as soon as possible they should be eradicated; that the Review was desirous of directing its efforts to the propagation of the truth of history, and, therefore, of acting upon this maxim, and insisted that I should make some contributions to that end. My reply was that the utmost I could do would be to signalize a few of the many errors of fact which the article contained, for the purpose of warning students of history to wait until the publication of the records of the rebellion covering that period should furnish the materials for demonstration. I, furthermore, represented to him that personally I had very great objections to troubling the public with piecemeal bits of information concerning war matters, to which the editor replied that it seemed a duty which men having held high commands in the military service owed to posterity, to contribute testimony upon obscure or mooted points while they were yet alive; that the matters treated of in the "Century" article were comparatively little understood by the general public; that the number of living witnesses to the events the article recounted was constantly diminishing; and that, while waiting for the means and the oppor-

tunity of a thorough history, the public ought to have at least something from me on the subject. I finally said that the true way would be to make a plain and summary statement of the facts involved, but that for lack of time to refer to reports and correspondence not yet published, I could not undertake to do it; that the most I would do would be to submit the following observations:

At the outset the article states:

"But after the investment of Vicksburg, Bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi."

My information, which is very positive, flatly contradicts that statement. Very few troops, if any, save cavalry, were detached from Bragg's command in Tennessee.

"I frequently wrote to General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he would either detain the latter's troops, or lay Chattanooga open to capture."

This shows that the author of the "Century" article did not understand the situation. Bragg, commanding the army of the Mississippi, was in middle Tennessee; his troops were largely Tennesseeans; he occupied two intrenched camps, and commanded the corn country of Duck and Elk rivers, with railway communication to Chattanooga for supplying his army. He was confronting a dangerous and powerful Union army, and had every reason for believing that he was rendering services of vital importance to the cause he represented. As the commander of the Union army facetiously remarked, like Squibob in the celebrated combat with the San Diego editor, "He was holding us down with his nose, which he had inserted between our teeth for that purpose."

Bragg's troops were already thus being detained, and the views of the author of the "Century" article to the contrary are illusory. As to laying "Chattanooga open to capture," subsequent events show what was required for that purpose. Had Bragg been driven across the Tennessee River, the Union army, for lack of railway transportation and forage, could not have followed him further than its banks within six weeks or two months. Meanwhile, the main body of his troops not being required to watch the crossings, Bragg would have been obliged to join Johnston, and so enable him to attack our besieging army at Vicksburg in the rear, or to compel it to quit its intrenchments and undertake a cam-

paign. Thus, what the author of the "Century" article urged to have done, instead of increasing his assurance of safety, would have drawn upon him the very forces which it was necessary to keep away. The author adds:

"General Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, replied, in effect," etc.

I never failed to comply with General Halleck's order; for he did not order me to advance; nor did I ever hold a council of war, as the author states, whatever may have been written to the contrary. What the article states further on, that "Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege," contains two errors. First, no such orders were given; second, no material bodies of troops were detached. On the 23d of June the Army of the Cumberland began its movements, and by the 4th of July occupied successively the enemy's intrenched camps, Shelbyville and Tullahoma, eighteen miles in the rear of Shelbyville, as formidably intrenched as those of the enemy at Vicksburg; and Bragg had retreated across the mountains and across the Tennessee River, and destroyed as far as possible the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, along which he had retired.

"I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened."

The student of history will note the above statement, because it signalizes one of the great difficulties which the Army of the Cumberland had subsequently to overcome; and he will best understand the paragraphs which immediately follow in that article by a statement of what the Army of the Cumberland had to do after the close of the Tullahoma campaign of fifteen days just mentioned—driving Bragg across the Tennessee River.

First, it had to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad from Murfreesboro forward to Winchester, in order to subsist the army at that point; second, it had to repair the same thence to Bridgeport, in order to carry forward supplies; and third, to reach Chattanooga. The reasons for this were, that this point admitted of the use of the Nashville and Chattanooga road, the Alabama

Central road, and part of the Memphis and Charleston road and river, as lines of supply. The possession of Chattanooga would make East Tennessee untenable by the enemy, cut off his use of the coal mines in the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee, from which he was supplying his furnaces at Etowah, and open the way into the heart of the Confederacy. The obstacles to be encountered were to cross these mountain ranges, keep up the supplies of the army, and force a passage of the Tennessee River in the face of the opposing enemy, or deceive him as to the point of crossing. Of these difficulties which had to be overcome, the author of the article appears to have had no conception. The repairs of the Nashville and Chattanooga road, the demonstrations necessary to deceive the enemy as to the point where the Tennessee River would be crossed, the preparation of material for ponton-bridges, and the training of men to handle them, were all carried on simultaneously from the day the campaign of Tullahoma ended. On the 18th of July, the first train from Nashville crossed the Elk River bridge, bringing supplies to the army of the Cumberland at Winchester. Sheridan's division was advanced to Stevenson and Bridgeport, covering the repairs of the railway, preventing the entire destruction of the railroad bridge, and taking possession of the river from below Caperton's Ferry, far above Bridgeport. The scanty equipment of the road, which was a five-feet gauge, on which no Northern engine could be used, made the process of accumulating supplies for the movement of the Army of the Cumberland comparatively slow. Nor could the Army of the Cumberland undertake this movement, after it crossed the Tennessee River, with a less supply than twenty days' rations and ammunition for two great battles. Food for the animals could not be carried, and the movement could not begin until corn was sufficiently ripe to supply it. On the 14th of August, the movement of the Army of the Cumberland began. The demonstrations planned and successfully executed were such as to force the enemy to the belief that the Army of the Cumberland would cross the Tennessee at or near Blythe's Ferry, forty-five miles above Chattanooga; while, in point of fact, it was determined to cross the river on ponton-bridges at Bridgeport, twenty-eight miles below Chattanooga, and at Caperton's Ferry, ten miles below Bridgeport. The length of the ponton-bridge at the latter place was 1,254 feet, and the ponton and trestle bridge at Bridgeport 2,700 feet long.

The success of the operations just described for the campaign depended upon keeping up the illusion of the enemy as to the point of crossing, Sheridan's head-quarters were at Stevenson, the junction of the Nashville and Chattanooga with the Memphis and Charleston road; Athens was occupied, and our cavalry occupied the Tennessee on the south. The railroad from Stevenson to Athens was open, and trains running upon it. The greatest quietude was observed. After they crossed the Cumberland Mountains, the troops encamped out of sight of the enemy from the cliffs of Sand Mountain on the south side of the river, and the ponton train was brought forward into Crow Creek Valley, and the pontoniers there trained in putting it up and taking it down. The river front was examined from Shell Mound downward past Sequatchee Valley to Bridgeport. Sequatchee is a deep and narrow valley separating the great mountain mass into two, Cumberland Mountain on the west, and Walden's Ridge on the east, only three or four miles wide at most, but fertile and tolerably well settled. This was occupied by the twenty-first corps, stretching for twenty miles up and down the valley, and making the largest possible display of force of all arms; while one brigade of cavalry and one brigade of mounted infantry were to drive everything across and occupy the west bank of the Tennessee River from Chattanooga northward, each backed by a brigade of infantry, encamped displayed, on the eastern edge of Walden's Ridge in sight of the Tennessee Valley above Chattanooga, and were to keep up the impression that our point of crossing would be about Blythe's Ferry. The enemy's movements demonstrated his conviction that this would be so.

These were but preliminary preparations. The great problem yet to be solved was to get the enemy out of Chattanooga, and the Army of the Cumberland into possession of it, and then to maintain it in that position. I had caused the enemy to concen trate his troops at and north of Chattanooga. I knew that the moment the Army of the Cumberland crossed the Tennessee River, Buckner would leave East Tennessee and join Bragg. Chattanooga is on the east side at the north end of Lookout Range, over which the only passes on the south side of the river, available for troops of all arms, were: first, at the nose of the mountain, near Chattanooga; second, at Johnston's pass, twenty-six miles south of it; and third, at Valley Head, forty-six miles south,

where a road leads down by Alpine into Broomtown Valley. To assault Chattanooga over the pass at the nose of the mountain near Chattanooga was impracticable. It was absolutely necessary to maneuver Bragg with his forces out of that position, the value of which Bragg, as well as I, knew. Such a maneuver could be successful only by threatening his communications at some considerable distance south of Chattanooga toward Atlanta, and the threat must necessarily be a very formidable one. It was therefore determined that, upon crossing the Tennessee River, the 20th Corps should go by Caperton's Ferry, cross Sand Mountain, ascend Wills' Creek (Lookout Valley) to Valley Head, whence the cavalry should precede it into Broomtown Valley, and operate with great vigor; that the corps commander should send a brigade down the eastern slope of Lookout Mountain, to Alpine, and possibly support it by two other brigades; that Thomas, with the 14th corps, should cross at Bridgeport over into Lookout Valley by another route, and ascend that valley in sight of the enemy on Lookout Mountain, until the head of the column should arrive at the foot of Johnston's pass, about four miles above Trenton; that Crittenden's corps, the 21st, with Reynolds' division of Thomas's corps, should cross—part at Shell Mound in boats, the remainder on the ponton and trestle bridge—follow Thomas's corps a short distance up Trenton Valley, sending a division to watch the road crossing over the nose of Lookout in his rear.

All these movements were arranged between the 20th and 28th. The effect of their execution was to be to compel the enemy to believe that a movement was to be made, by the way of Alpine, to strike his communications at Rome or its vicinity, and, by keeping up this belief, to induce him to withdraw at least so far south of Chattanooga that we should be able to concentrate our entire command there.

That we should be obliged to fight a great battle for the possession of Chattanooga was beyond possible military doubt. Had this movement of the Army of the Cumberland been sustained, as it ought betimes to have been, by the concentration of the Army of the Tennessee near Decatur, for a movement into north-eastern Alabama, or further north, so as to be within supporting distance; had Burnside closed down on the left flank of its movement, as was the original understanding, there might have been less certainty of its being obliged to fight such a battle for the possession

of Chattanooga. But as it was, that army, the only force which stood between the enemy and the Ohio Valley, through no fault or negligence of its commander, had been put in great and needless peril. The interests of the Confederacy were supreme in crushing it, or, at least, in defeating the object of its campaign. From its inception I foresaw this, and the absolute necessity of making provision for the maintenance of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, when we should get possession of it. I therefore ordered to be built, at Bridgeport, five flat-bottom, stern-wheel steamboats, to be used between there and Chattanooga in the lowest stages of water, and placed the business of constructing them in charge of Captain Edwards, an efficient quartermaster. The material for the construction of these boats was brought down, the engines ordered from the shops in the North, the first hull launched, and the second hull nearly ready to be launched between the 20th and the 28th of August, when the Army of the Cumberland began its movement across the river. During the ten days intervening between my arrival at Stevenson and the beginning of the movement, I had also telegraphed for the representatives of the railroad bridge building firms of Fletcher & Co., of Cleveland, and Boomer & Co., of Chicago, and contracted with them for repairing the railroad bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, to be done in four weeks, and the Running Water Bridge—the only other large railway bridge between that and Chattanooga—to be completed within two weeks from the time of the passage of the first freight train over the Bridgeport Bridge. The Running Water Bridge was of three spans—each span 171 feet, the center pier 110 feet high. There is nothing in the "Century" article to indicate anything of this, and yet it is a very significant part of the history of that campaign.

The Army of the Cumberland began to cross the Tennessee River on the 28th of August, and the movement was continued according to the plan. Its effect, as anticipated, was to cause Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga about the 8th or 9th of September, and move slowly south. Of course, the country, the air, and everything was filled with rumors as to the enemy's movements. As soon as Bragg's movement was known, I directed General Thomas to ascend Johnston's Pass to the top of Lookout Mountain, and to descend at Cooper's Gap on the east side; to occupy a defensive position at the foot of the gap, which would keep up the

enemy's belief that we meant to cut his communications with Atlanta, and prevent him retracing his steps, which, upon the contrary belief, he would promptly have done, into Chattanooga. While Thomas was thus ordered to move over Lookout, at Johnston's and Cooper's Gaps, the twenty-first corps, under General T. L. Crittenden, instead of waiting to follow Thomas, was ordered to follow the road over the nose of the mountain into Chattanooga, taking with him the reserve artillery, leave it there in charge of a brigade, move out on the enemy's lines of withdrawal south, and ascertain his movements. On the 9th it was found that the enemy was retiring slowly and in force, toward Lafayette, and later, on the 10th or 11th, it was found that he was concentrating at that point.

What grounds there were for the popular impression which had been so assiduously fostered in certain quarters, that we had possession of Chattanooga, appears from this. It is for the reader to understand what kind of possession that was. As Lafayette was only thirty miles from Chattanooga, and we had to concentrate between the enemy and that place, the space was very limited. Thomas's corps was on the flank of that interspace, on the north side of the South Chickamauga, and Crittenden, who had moved out on the roads to the east of Thomas's position, was ordered to move, with all possible secrecy and dispatch, westward to supporting distance of Thomas. At the same time the twentieth corps (McCook's) was ordered to move with all possible celerity from its position on the eastern slope of Lookout, near Alpine, to which, without orders, it had been moved from Valley Head, and to join Thomas. Meanwhile, on the 14th, we learned that Longstreet had arrived at Atlanta with his corps from Lee's army, and was to join in the fight. Fully aware of the perils of the situation, I had ordered up General Granger to the vicinity of Winchester, and now dispatched orders to him to go immediately to Chattanooga with Steadman's division and McCook's and Spear's brigades. The suspense while these orders were being carried was fearful; but finally, on the morning of the 18th, the head of McCook's column arrived at the top of Cooper's Gap, and under cover of a strong picket line along the South Chickamauga, the movement of Crittenden's and Thomas's corps began to the north-eastward, to get on the roads leading through Rossville, between the enemy and Chattanooga. Four hours of precious time were lost by the delay of

General Hazen, who, until he received orders through the regular channel, declined to be relieved by General Negly's division sent for the purpose of enabling him to join his division commander. These two corps moved all the night of the 18th by a line of fires built through the woods; and by daylight of the 19th, General Thomas with his corps was planted across the Gordon's Mills and Rossville road to Chattanooga. Thus, by the delay in the arrival of the twentieth corps and that just mentioned, though concentrated between the enemy and Chattanooga, our toil-worn troops, unable to choose our own battle-ground, were obliged to begin the battle of the 19th and 20th of September, 1863, for the possession of that place, knowing that they alone stood between a powerful, veteran army and the Ohio River.

In the light of all this the reader will be able to understand what is to be thought of the statement in the "Century" article, beginning, "Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance," and with whom must rest the terrible responsibility that the troops of the Army of the Tennessee, anxious to come to our aid—which ought to have come up six weeks before, as the "Century" article says—did not in fact get orders to move until the 23d of September, two days after the battle of Chickamauga had given us beyond peradventure the possession of Chattanooga. It will also appear what weight should attach to the remark that—

"Meanwhile, Rosecrans had very skillfully manœuvered Bragg south of the Tennessee, through and beyond Chattanooga."

Bragg was not maneuvered south of the Tennessee River, and through Chattanooga, during the campaign. He had been there for two months. Ever since the campaign of Tullahoma drove him out of middle Tennessee he had occupied that side of the river. It will appear also what is to be thought of the statement, "if he (Rosecrans) had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there," etc. The writer of the "Century" article, after all these years, and with all his military ideas, does not seem to comprehend the situation, nor the utter error of saying that—

"He pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him, then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at Chickamauga," etc.

In the light of all the foregoing facts, that we fought the enemy on the 19th and 20th, on a battle-ground not of our own choosing, and offered him battle on the 21st, at Rossville, only three miles from our position on those days, and took possession of Chattanooga on the following night, what is to be thought of the statement that—

"Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery, and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded, and captured. The corps under Major-general George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga?"

In the light of ample documentary evidence, with which the writer certainly had abundant opportunity to become acquainted, this statement can be regarded in no other way than as a bold untruth. The order of battle of the 20th is in writing; the official reports amply testify that I had reinforced Thomas's corps by Johnston's Division of McCook's, the 20th, and Palmer's Division of the 21st, on the day before; that all the remaining troops on the field, save two brigades of Jeff C. Davis's and three of Sheridan's, were, by my order, with General Thomas before one o'clock of the afternoon of the 20th; that General Thomas had repeated orders from me to hold his position at all hazards; that having made various orders to meet actual and possible exigencies, which I sent by Garfield to explain to him, in the afternoon, near the close of the fight, I sent one to him which he received about five o'clock, while awaiting an impending attack of the enemy; that those orders were that he should use his discretion as to whether we should hold the ground which we would occupy, and have ammunition and everything else brought there, or to retire to Rossville; that he exercised that discretion, and ordered the troops back to that position; that I approved of his movements, directed him to dispose of the troops, to receive the enemy's attack, in case he dared to make one, at that point, and ordered up troops and ammunition accordingly; that the Army of the Cumberland waited there all day the 21st, offering the enemy battle, which he declined; and that having laid out the lines, and made necessary dispositions for the definite and continued occupation of Chattanooga, I withdrew the army from its position at Rossville, during the night of the 21st, and took possession of the lines at Chattanooga.

Thus the Army of the Cumberland, beginning to move from

Winchester on the 14th of August, had crossed the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee—a wide and formidable river—the Sand Mountain, and Lookout Ranges, carrying from Bridgeport twenty days' rations and ammunition sufficient to fight two great battles, fought a great battle, and took and held possession of Chattanooga, seventy-six miles distant from the point of departure—fourteen miles farther than from Fredericksburg to Richmond—in a campaign of thirty-eight days.

Though obliged to fight the inevitable battle for that purpose on ground of the enemy's choosing, we defeated his attempt to crush us, and held the objective points of the campaign at a cost of men and material which the country would have willingly paid for its possession at any time within the two preceding years.

No true soldier could overlook or fail to appreciate the merits of a campaign which in thirty-eight days overcame such obstacles, and from the jaws of such peril snatched and held a strategic position so valuable. Why then did the author of the "Century" article fail to do so?

The next thing after getting Chattanooga was to keep it.

The preliminary preparations for supplying the Army of the Cumberland at that point, made before crossing the river, have been already stated—contracts for rebuilding the Bridgeport and Running Water Railway bridges, to be finished within six weeks, and the construction of five flat-bottom, stern-wheel steamers, for navigating the river between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Now, on the 21st of September, having possession of Chattanooga, the first thing was to construct and occupy suitable and defensive lines for the army.

That the intelligent reader may form some idea of what it was and how this was done, let him examine a map of Chattanooga and its vicinity, and he will see that the town is situated on the north-west corner of a rolling plain in the bend of the Tennessee River, which bounds it on the north, where the river runs east and west, and on the west, where it runs in a course nearly south for about three miles and a half, to a bend where it breaks through a gorge between Lookout Mountain and the southern extremity of Walden's Ridge, whence it takes a north-westerly direction until the mass of Raccoon Mountain drives it nearly northerly for a distance of several miles. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad runs from the town south-westerly, until it strikes the

east end of this big bend, and then, turning, follows the bank of the river, under high precipitous cliffs, for about a mile, where it emerges into the Valley of Lookout, or Wills' Creek ; thence it passes westerly through a gap between Raccoon Mountain on the north and Sand Mountain on the south, and from there to Bridgeport, a total distance of about twenty-eight miles. About two miles south of the town is Chattanooga Creek, coming down from the south, and cutting a crooked, deep channel in the alluvium, and running into the Tennessee River near the south-western side of the great bend just described. Artillery and infantry cannot pass it without bridging.

Three miles east of the town are foot-hills belonging to Missionary Ridge, a mountain mass, some six hundred or eight hundred feet high, running nearly north and south, and overlooking it at a distance of about four miles from the town. At the southerly end of this mass is the town of Rossville, in a low gap, the gate-way to this plane, which the Army of the Cumberland held on the 21st of September.

I very much desired to extend my line south of Chattanooga Creek, to cover the railway line and wagon road across the pass over the north end of Lookout Mountain, but found that to do this would so expose my right, that, in case of a serious attack at that point, I might be obliged to withdraw my command from Chattanooga to defend it, and thus practically be compelled to give up the town and go over into Lookout Valley. This was not to be thought of. I therefore adopted such lines as I could occupy, and defend beyond peradventure, leaving the end of Lookout temporarily to be taken possession of by the enemy. But to prevent that enemy from being able to pass over it into Lookout Valley with artillery and wagons, in large force, and to impede any passage, except by stealth, across the nose of the mountain, I placed batteries on Moccasin Point, on the north side of the river opposite the nose of Lookout, so as to command the passage along the railway under the cliffs, and also greatly impede the use of the wagon road over the slopes above. Bridge connection with the north side of the river, so as to communicate at once with Bridgeport on that side, was immediately to be made. For that purpose, for many reasons, two ponton-bridges were to be built forthwith. Orders were given to the chiefs of the Pioneer Corps to have all the pontoon-trains that could be spared brought

up from Bridgeport. Materials were also sought wherever they could be found in Chattanooga, to complete these structures. Lumber was so scarce that houses had to be torn down, and the saw-mill of which the "Century" article speaks was put in order, and Colonel Stanley, of the 18th Ohio, was charged with preparing boats, balks, and chesses, with all possible dispatch, so that the wagon trains could at once go and come between our positions and Bridgeport by way of Jasper, in Sequatchee Valley, over Walden's Ridge, a distance of about forty-six miles, and bring supplies to the army.

Our cavalry and mounted infantry were posted along the west side of the Tennessee River, above Chattanooga, to cover from the enemy's operations this line of communication over the mountain. The remaining portion of the Pioneer Corps was ordered to take care of the bridge at Bridgeport. Two brigades of cavalry were detailed to occupy the country south of it, to prevent incursions on our lines of supplies, and depots at Stevenson, from that direction.

The enemy advancing occupied Missionary Ridge and the foothills in front of our lines, established a force on the south side of Chattanooga Creek, commanding the road over the nose of Lookout, sent troops to Summertown up on its top, planted some batteries on the northerly slope of Lookout, opposite Moccasin Point, and sent five or six regiments over into Lookout Valley to watch the west bank of that portion of the river from the railway down to far below Brown's Ferry, which at once put a stop on attempts to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway between our position and Bridgeport, until they could be driven from Lookout.

General Halleck notified me on the 21st that Hooker, with the 11th and 12th Corps, Army of the Potomac (Howard and Slocum), had been ordered to reinforce us, and would soon be on their way.

In a few days the first ponton-bridge was completed, the river above guarded and watched to prevent attempts to break it, and the second followed as rapidly as material for it could be prepared. The enemy's occupation of Lookout Valley having temporarily deprived us of the use of the road on the south side of the river, and the repairing of the railway bridges, as the contracts required, he massed his cavalry seventy miles north of Chattanooga, in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Hiwassee, under General Wheeler, who, with three divisions, forced his passage at ten

different places, driving our cavalry, only two brigades, under Crook.

The object of the enemy's movements was to cross Walden's Ridge, the Sequatchee Valley, the Cumberland Mountains, and to strike and destroy the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, known to be our only line of supplies. Order was promptly given to General Crook to hang on the flank and rear of the enemy's column, and fight and delay him to the utmost. Colonel Ed. McCook was ordered to march with the two brigades which had been watching the river below Bridgeport, to join Crook. They were then both to follow the enemy and hang upon his flank and rear. Hooker, whose column was on its way from Louisville, was ordered to post his infantry so as to protect Duck and Elk River and other important railway bridges and trestle-works, and our depots at Stevenson and Bridgeport, with his main body at Stevenson.

Neither time nor space admits of detailing the operations of this formidable and dangerous raid on our communications—it would be aside from the purpose of these observations. Suffice it to say, that the Union cavalry, faithful to its orders, harassed and kept Wheeler's column in motion, and Hooker's movements preserved the railway almost intact. Crook overtook the enemy at Lexington, Tenn., fifteen miles south of Shelbyville, and defeated him, captured his cannon, and drove him pell-mell south of the Tennessee River at various points between Florence and Decatur. During Wheeler's raid the only serious damage he did us was on his way across to McMinnville. In Sequatchee he found a train of one hundred wagons, which he destroyed before Colonel Ed. McCook's column reached the spot, where La Grange charged and drove Wheeler's rear guard and followed him. As soon as this raid came to its inglorious end, Hooker closed down his troops by rail to Bridgeport and Stevenson. The capacity of the railway being already overtaxed, his trains were ordered to come down by the wagon road.

For the first ten or fifteen days after we occupied Chattanooga, the mountain road north of the river was in good condition. There was a cut around the face of the cliffs of Walden's Ridge which the wagons could follow, and our supplies came to us without difficulty. As soon as the enemy's troops in Lookout Valley found that we were using this short cut, they posted sharp-shooters with long-range rifles on the west side of the river to fire across and in-

terrupt the movements of trains. This gave us very serious difficulty, and greatly impeded the use of the road. Along about the end of the first week of October rains set in, the roads grew worse, and the difficulty of bringing supplies by wagon greatly increased. In the midst of all these operations and solicitudes I had been working with indefatigable energy to get ready the pontons and materials for a third ponton-bridge, which was indispensable for securing and holding control of the south side of the river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga.

Hooker was advised that as soon as his wagon trains could be ready to move he would be ordered to cross the river at Bridgeport and follow the line of the road up to the vicinity of Wauhatchee. He was to be put in connection with the rest of the army by a ponton-bridge across the Tennessee River at or near Brown's Ferry, so that, in case the enemy should attempt to crush him, there would be no difficulty in receiving support from us by the short route across the neck of land between Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry.

The great difficulty was to obtain material for this third ponton-bridge. Colonel Stanley, of the 18th Ohio, who with two regiments had been employed from the beginning in getting out the necessary materials for the two bridges, was now getting the materials for this third bridge. So urgent was I to have this completed, that I personally and almost daily visited the work. Colonel Stanley was running the saw-mill to cut out what materials we had, and searching among the houses for more. While completing the first two bridges, General William F. Smith arrived and was assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. He was told what the plan was for opening communication with Bridgeport on the south side of the river, and what preparations were in progress for its execution; and, moreover, that upon the arrival of the troops then on their way I intended to drive the enemy from Missionary Ridge. I requested him to examine the river above Chattanooga, with a view of ascertaining its capabilities and adaptation for a movement on the enemy's right, at the north end of Missionary Ridge. A sketch was made of the river and route to Brown's Ferry, the route by which troops would be able to communicate from the Chattanooga side of the river with Lookout Valley, over the ponton-bridge, which we were straining every nerve to secure. The plan was talked over with General

Thomas and General Th. L. Coulton, and a copy of the sketch was sent to General Hooker, who was told to hurry up his transportation as rapidly as possible, so that on crossing the Tennessee River he would be able to subsist his troops directly from Bridgeport. On the 19th of October, General W. F. Smith accompanied me in a ride along this route and the Tennessee near Brown's Ferry. We returned about sunset, when I found the telegrams awaiting me which released me from the command of the Army of the Cumberland and placed General Thomas in command.

These facts will show the reader what is to be thought of the statements and implications contained in the "Century" article respecting the likelihood of my evacuating Chattanooga. That calumny never had the slightest foundation in fact, and that it should have found its way, after all these years, again to the public through such a source, is all the more strange and nexcusable.

The author goes on to give the pitiable condition in which the Army of the Cumberland was at a date which he does not state, but leaves the implication that it was at the time of his arrival at Chattanooga. I affirm that when I left it, on the 20th of October, the Army of the Cumberland was in no such condition as the author of the "Century" article represents, as to supplies, rations, or fuel. Cameron Hill was covered with woods; the whole north side of the river was wooded. Teams were hauling and delivering rations; although the time of making the trips was lengthened, and the loads they could haul were diminished, still they were hauling. Doubtless the animals were thin, because forage was scarce. No longer ago than the 4th of November, I conversed with Colonel G. C. Kniffin, then Chief Commissary of the Army, than whom no more able or truthful officer lives, and who had the best possible opportunity of knowing the facts, and he fully concurs with me in this statement.

The author of the "Century" article says that he telegraphed to Thomas that he was to "hold Chattanooga at all hazards," informing him at the same time that "I [the writer of the 'Century' article] would be at the front as soon as possible." I well remember the receipt of that telegram, and the surprise and indignation with which Thomas and I viewed it. We regarded it as an aspersion on the Army of the Cumberland and its commander, founded either in ignorance or malice. We had as little idea of

abandoning Chattanooga as anybody in the world. The author says:

"A prompt reply was received from Thomas, saying, 'We will hold the town till we starve.' I appreciated the force of this dispatch later, when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it."

The author of the "Century" article does not give the full dispatch, which was:

"Our trains are hauling rations from Bridgeport, and we will hold the town until we starve."

The author says further:

"On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way North. He came into my car, and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done," etc.

The suggestions to which the author alludes were a detail of the plan, already explained, for establishing communication between the army at Chattanooga and Hooker's troops, on the south side of the river, which were to be brought up by the way of Wauhatchee to Lookout Valley. Doubtless they were "excellent suggestions," for they were precisely the ones which the author of the "Century" article followed. Yet he says, "My only wonder was that he had not carried them out." I think the intelligent reader will wonder whether it was stupidity or malice which dictated this foolish expression, and will himself feel no wonder that as yet they had not been carried out. Every effort had been made to that end. Detailing what happened on the evening after his arrival in Chattanooga, the author says:

"During the evening, most of the general officers called in to pay their respects, and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the maps the line marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon."

Poor man! no officer of the Army of the Cumberland ever told him that I contemplated falling back. The line, if any, which was pointed out to him, was the line of communication by way of Brown's Ferry, to be established between the troops in Chattanooga and the troops to come into Lookout Valley, which, as heretofore stated, was part of the plan for controlling the communication on the south side of the river, between Bridgeport

and Chattanooga, and had no reference whatever to a line of retreat. The author states that :

"I found that he (General W. F. Smith) had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood."

The intelligent reader will understand who established the saw-mill long before General Smith's arrival, and wonder why the author of the "Century" article makes the statement in that way. He says, in addition to this, that General Smith had under way "a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport." That was probably one of the five steamers which I had ordered to be built before I crossed the river.

The author of that article says, "That night (the 24th of October) I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport." All the preliminaries for these orders have already been described. They had been detailed to him by me at Stevenson, and the reader will appreciate at its proper worth a statement which fails to take any notice of all this, and gives to the public the impression that it was his genius which conceived the plan. No intelligent reader can fail to see that the intention of the writer of the "Century" article is to have it pass for history that his was the plan, and his the orders which opened the route from Chattanooga to Bridgeport, on the south side of the river. This fraud, this lie, has been floating before the public for twenty odd years; but it is explicitly nailed to the pillory by the opening paragraph of General Thomas's official report of the operations, wherein he says, "*In pursuance of the plan of General Rosecrans, the execution of which had been deferred until Hooker's transportation could be got*," etc., and then follows a description of his operations. This noble and chivalrous testimonial by General Thomas was placed on record on the books of the Army of the Cumberland, wherein was written the report made by the author of the "Century" article, in which he said that he did it. But this statement by General Thomas won for him the undying dislike of the author of the "Century" article.

Further, the article says :

"General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac, to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to have sent them to Chat-

tanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport."

I have already stated what were Hooker's orders and advices; and now and here I state that the movement of Hooker, the occupation of Lookout Valley and its connection with the troops at Chattanooga, for which the writer of the "Century" article claims such credit, would have taken place all the same had he never lived. Some of the chief witnesses are dead, but many are living; and the records of the war, when published, will amply demonstrate these facts.

I have said enough concerning this article in the "Century" to warn readers and students of the military history of the war that the article abounds in inaccurate, misleading, and untruthful statements. Forbearing that detail which any unbiased critic could readily make of the proofs that the author of the "Century" article misstated facts to gratify dislikes of others and to glorify himself, my affection for Thomas will not allow me to close these notes without calling attention to the statement on page 137 of that article:

"On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them, to move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order."

To the casual reader this unquestionably means a reproach upon General Thomas, and upon it I ask the following questions: If the execution of that order were possible, and General Thomas failed to obey, why did not the author of the "Century" article arrest General Thomas and put some one in command who would execute it? If it were *not* possible, why did he give the order, and why does he now bring the matter before the public? If Thomas was right, then the order was wrong, and the giver of it ought to have frankly said so.

All the statements of his subsequent operations up to the battle of Missionary Ridge are made with a view of showing what Badeau's calumnious and untruthful life of the author of that article pretends; namely, that the battle of Missionary Ridge was fought as

it was planned. Neither documentary evidence nor the recollection of living witnesses sustains that view. There are thousands who know and assert that the breaking of the enemy's center was neither ordered nor foreseen.

On page 140 of the "Century" article, the author of that article makes an ambiguous statement that might readily be interpreted as a reflection upon Thomas:

> "Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position."

This, without further remark, is open to the inference that General Thomas acted out of time, while in fact he did more than was expected, and did it well.

The principles and habits of a long life with me have been against the obtrusion of personal views upon public attention; but truth and justice require that, upon historical events especially within my cognizance, I should not in silence permit insatiable and conscienceless egotism, under the shadow of a great name, to masquerade as the muse of history.

W. S. ROSECRANS.

A DISFRANCHISED PEOPLE.

We hear much about class legislation in the past, of government intended for the immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole; of the organization of the rich against the poor, the strong against the weak. Against such evils it is commonly believed that democracies provide the most effective security, and especially that the American Democracy has made such conditions impossible within its borders. But it has been well said by high authority that one of the greatest dangers of democracy, as of all other forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power. It is the old danger of class legislation. It matters little whether the class be termed Democratic or Republican, Royalist or Imperialist, its leaders Senators or Representatives, peers or princes. Their likeness is visible in their origin—in the corrupting influence of undivided power invested with invidious prerogatives, infusing its leaven until at last, the people becoming inured to the evil, all useful opposition vanishes, and the moderating influence of a healthy minority disappears.

If the average voter of the United States were informed that in the heart of our population there existed a class of intelligent people disfranchised, deprived of political rights and condemned by acts of legislature to the perpetual yoke of one political party, he would doubtless think twice before accepting the facts without good warrant. Yet this, it appears, is the present condition of affairs in the old Commonwealth of Delaware.

The Rev. Edward Everett Hale very recently touched upon this subject in a speech delivered at Boston. Thus prompted, and moved by a desire to lay before the readers of the North American Review a succinct and accurate account of the methods adopted, the writer sent to Delaware a commissioner charged with the careful and circumstantial investigation of representation in

that State. The result of this investigation, based upon the facts furnished, will now be laid before our readers.

It may be well, however, to say at the outset that we are not prompted by the shibboleth of any party, and that the endeavor has been to conduct all research in a spirit free from the stain of partisan purpose. Should such glaring evils at any time appear in a State devoted to Republican interests, it would offer to us a field equally inviting for inquiry and grave reflection.

By organization and circumstance, Delaware is peculiarly adapted to honesty in politics. A small State, containing no large cities, its people are acquaintances. They are too well known to each other to make any kind of cheating safe and easy. Again, Delaware is too near the great forces of the North to sustain Ku-Klux and shot-gun manners in the enforcement of political policy. Yet there is no doubt whatever that a very large part of the citizens of Delaware, belonging to one of its great political parties, are as thoroughly disfranchised, by legal chicanery, as any community of negroes in Mississippi were ever disfranchised by physical intimidation.

In Delaware a vote rests on a tax. The beautiful and aristocratic little State reverses the principle which opened the American Revolution—"no taxation without representation"—and has laid down the principle, "no representation without taxation." Her constitution provides that, in order to possess the right of an elector, every citizen of the age of twenty-two and upward shall pay a county-tax within the two years preceding the election at which he votes, and that this tax shall have been assessed at least six months before the election.

However questionable this enactment may be in the ethics of actual democracy, the original purpose of it was an honest one. That purpose was simply to establish a practical registry law, and to see that the registry should be completed six months before election, giving ample time for inspection. The constitution containing this provision was adopted under the auspices of the Whig party in 1831.

In the case of persons having no taxable property, the amount of the county-tax qualifying them to vote ranged from eighty cents to three dollars a head, being a "poll-tax." The collectors were held responsible for the return of every tax, unless they could show that the persons whose assessments were unpaid were absolutely too

poor to pay them. The assessors were required to make full lists of all citizens in the several districts—called "hundreds"—and the names remained perennially on the lists, unless it appeared, by the returns of the collectors, that the persons bearing the names were dead or had left the State. The result was that every citizen of Delaware was assessed, and that every citizen who paid his taxes had a full and free opportunity to vote.

Practically, there was no perversion of this system until the enfranchisement of the blacks by the amendment of the United States Constitution under which they first voted in 1870. Then, to the average Democrat of Delaware, as of the various States farther south, it appears that the presumed outrage on human nature, perpetrated by allowing a black man to vote, justified any resistance to law, or any perversion of morality, that could be made effective in defeating the purpose of the United States. In giving expression to this sentiment, the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, in a speech at Milford in 1872, began with these words: "My fellow-men!—thank God I can still say my fellow white men!"

It appears that in March of that year (1872), by concerted action, the collectors of taxes, all of them being Democrats, returned the names of large numbers of the blacks as "dead," or as having "left the State;" and that these returns were adopted by the levy courts, which were also composed entirely of Democrats. But article fifteen of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States had provided that the right of citizens to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Under the enforcement act supplementary to this fundamental law, the levy court of New Castle County, and some of the most conspicuous tax-collectors, were indicted in the United States Circuit Court, for denying to the blacks the equal right to qualify to vote because of race and color. One of these collectors, Archibald Given, was tried before the Circuit Court at Wilmington, in June, 1872 (Mr. Justice Strong, of United States Supreme Court, presiding), and was convicted and fined. The law having been thus established, the remaining cases were not pressed.

All of these cases were defended by Thomas F. Bayard, and his present successor in the United States Senate, Mr. Gray.

But now, again, to indict a State officer in a Federal court, for executing a State law, to say nothing of convicting such a sacred

functionary, seems to have been the abomination of abominations to the Democratic soul of Delaware. Shades of Calhoun and of Patrick Henry, what was to be done!

The answer came, spoken in deeds even louder than words: "We will see whether an act cannot be drafted that will enable the State officers to disqualify a black voter without technically violating a federal statute."

In order, however, to disqualify the blacks, it was necessary now to disqualify Republicans in general, without distinction of race or color. So, to this end—the Democrats having more than a two-thirds vote in each branch of the Legislature—special laws were passed on the 9th and 10th of April, 1873, in effect as follows:

Upon the affidavit of a collector of county taxes that, in the month of January in each year, he had given public notice of the times and places at which he would attend to receive taxes, and that he had so attended for three days, it was made the duty of the levy court having him in jurisdiction to allow the collector, as delinquencies, the taxes uncollected by him, the names of his delinquents being dropped from the assessment list, not to be placed thereon again for twelve months after the date of the allowance. And the special animus of this legislation was put in these words: "*Provided*, that the provisions of this section shall apply to persons assessed and liable to pay poll-tax."

But here it must be explained that the collector makes his return of delinquents on the first Tuesday of March. During the same month the levy court acts upon them and makes the allowance of them, the names being dropped from the date of this allowance, for twelve months. But, by the law, the assessor completes his return of assessments *in February* of each year. Consequently, any voter after the expiration of his twelve months of exclusion in March, finds that he must wait eleven months longer, until the succeeding February, before he can again be assessed, unless he can procure the reinstatement of his name by action of a levy court—a thing, it appears, which has been rendered so expensive and difficult by the process of doing it, and by the obstacles interposed by the courts themselves, as to be commonly impracticable. So, by omitting to pay his taxes in any one year, a citizen of Delaware, not so fortunate as to be the owner of property, is disfranchised for two years.

Once again: The elections of the State occurring, as elsewhere, in November, a person not owning property—every poor man—is obliged, in order to qualify as a voter, to pay his taxes nine months before election. And this he must do in the winter, when he is generally out of work, and needs every dollar that he can save or earn.

So much for the character of these statutory enactments themselves. But the perfection of their injustice is only to be appreciated by understanding the practical administration of them. Think of this one feature: they make it entirely optional with the tax-collector whether he return the non-taxpayer as a delinquent or keep him on the list. With rare and marvelous exceptions, the Democratic collectors, it seems, have exercised this option to their liking. There has been no difficulty about simply returning the Republicans as delinquents, and retaining the Democrats for their own party uses, according to the intent of the law and the dictation of their leaders. When an election arrives, the taxes of Democrats can be paid, but the Republicans may be out of the contest. They then have no way to vote, even if they are ready to pay. Besides, at the approach of all sharp political contests, the collectors have it in their power to employ every possible device to keep out of reach of Republicans, with the purpose that their names may not be retained on the tax lists, and that their votes may not be received.

In short, while many Democrats fully perceive and frankly acknowledge the iniquity of this state of things, and while some exceptional Democratic officials strive to carry out the laws, such as they are, impartially, there seems to be no doubt that the old Commonwealth of Delaware is substantially in possession of a thoroughly organized band of political conspirators, who have taken it out of the hands of the people, and hold it under their own absolute dictation.

Although not strictly pertinent, it may be well to add here, in a word, that, connected with this system of direct political larceny, which was inaugurated for the purpose of disfranchising a population, the representation of Delaware, in relation to counties, is so gerrymandered for her legislature that the majority have no immediate means of redress from the minority, even in the direction of remedial law. From every aspect, indeed, the poor little State of Delaware appears to have been converted into a pocket

oligarchy, and the political perquisite of those who have been unpatriotic enough to make her a lamentable exception to the true principles of representation and to the true American idea.

It may be asked who is responsible for this condition of affairs. It is the inevitable sequence, the natural growth of the statute of 1873, which it has been the present purpose to explain. In a political speech in 1882, in the city of Wilmington, Secretary Bayard acknowledged the most objectionable features of that statute to be the work of his own hands. He seems to have justified it, though with some circumlocution, as a means of enabling his State to elude the penalties of federal law. But, in the real light of the recent history of his State, how is the conclusion to be avoided by any capable, not to say impartial mind, that, through the instrumentality of that measure, partisan cunning, injustice and dishonesty have reached their lowest ebb in our public life, and that, in reality, the "whited sepulcher" is a prominent feature in our political architecture?

THE EDITOR.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

I.

In May, 1883, I was instrumental in founding the American Copyright League, the plan of which had been in my mind for several years. At that date, I learned that R. W. Gilder, editor of the "Century Magazine," and Dr. Edward Eggleston had planned a similar organization, without my knowledge, about two years before, but had never attempted to carry it out. I brought forward my plan before I knew of the other, and insisted that something ought to be done. After much correspondence and some personal interviews, I succeeded in getting up a meeting of authors, at the house of Mr. Brander Matthews. The result was very discouraging, because of the great variety of opinion expressed; but I persisted, and finally formed an executive committee of twenty, of which I was made secretary—the only officer besides the treasurer. This was the nucleus of the League. The committee subscribed a little money, but the treasurer went abroad, the acting treasurer left the city, and for six months I paid the expenses of the organization out of my own pocket. I enrolled thirty or forty members in the League, and something less than a dozen were enrolled by others. Finally, when Mr. Dorsheimer, without consulting us, brought in an international copyright bill in the House, the apathy of my associates had caused me almost to despair. But they were suddenly aroused. We went to work supporting the Dorsheimer bill, and adding to our roll until it contained seven hundred names. Mr. R. U. Johnson performed a vast and noble work in thus enlarging the membership. After the Dorsheimer bill failed to get a hearing, we introduced the Hawley bill in the Senate. It was stifled in the Committee on the Judiciary. I thought it a good bill to introduce, then. I assisted in drafting it, and before it was offered every word of it was submitted for my approval, as the authorized chairman of a sub-committee of the League's Executive Committee. Careful inquiry afterwards showed me that the Dorsheimer and Hawley bills had failed because they made no provision for *printing* foreign copyright books in this country. Paper-makers, typefounders, compositors, printers, binders, and a few publishers exerted a secret but decisive influence against the bills. These men were not opposed to international copyright, but capital and labor are both timid of changes in the condition of the market, and will always look out for the security of their own money interest before everything else. It was much easier and safer for them to kill or stifle an unsatisfactory bill, than to assist in bringing it to vote, and then offering an amendment which might not be carried.

Nearly all authors agree that a mere obligation to have the *printing* of books done in a certain country would not injure the rights and interests of authors. Consequently, it is absurd to stand against the imposing of such an obligation, when by consenting to it we could bring all the paper-makers, printers, binders, and most publishers to the support of a bill with a "printing clause."

Viewing the subject in this light, Allen Thorndike Rice, in May, 1885, moved, at a meeting of the Executive Committee, that we should insert in our constitution a statement (not to be published, of course, but merely to define and limit our policy) that we were willing to advocate a bill containing a "printing clause." He was supported by Prof. E. L. Youmans, Mr. Richard Henry Stoddard, and myself. Although I had approved the Hawley bill at the proper time, I agreed with Mr. Rice that in the light of experience and information, it ought to be offered again in an amended form. We held votes and proxies enough to carry the motion, but could not bring it to vote. Seeing that the mood of the Committee was dilatory and impracticable, Mr. Rice, Mr. Stoddard, and I resigned.

Certain members of the Committee, who never took and never would have taken the trouble to found a Copyright League and work gratuitously for it, insist that no concession shall be made as to printing in this country, if we give copyright to foreigners; although nearly all European countries place similar conditions and limitations upon copyright to foreigners. This body of gentlemen, who are authors, or represent authorship to a certain extent, are, I am sorry to say, one of the chief obstacles in the way of obtaining international copyright in this country. And, curiously enough, it was I who—setting out to gain international copyright—united them in the movement which they are now turning into an obstructionist one. If I wanted to characterize their action mildly, I should call it wild. If I wanted to stigmatize it severely, I should describe it as puerile.

GEORGE PARSONS LATHROP.

II.

MR. EDITOR: Somewhat to my disappointment, I find that the September number of the REVIEW lacks a most vigorous Comment upon "the Profane View of the Sanctum" taken in July by Rev. Savage. It seems to me that, in the interest of truth, if for no lesser reason, some one should have replied to it. Editors, I know, are prone to publish their own "comments," and, weary of the popular race to put one's words and name in print, are not inclined to volunteer personal contributions to rival or contemporary publications. Editors write for money, not "notoriety." But the errors and untruths in Mr. Savage's screed were so numerous that some able pen should have paused for a moment to aim in that direction.

I think an editorial "we" *is* justified by the fact that not the editors' personal opinions, but the wishes of manager, directors, and possibly friends, are expressed. The sources of editorial utterances are far anterior to the mouthpiece—in other words, beyond the personality of the writer. Does not Mr. Savage give the answer to his own aspersion, when he speaks of the editor performing double duty, and says: "It is somewhat difficult, therefore, to dis-

cover whether these leaders of public opinion themselves possess any opinions at all?"

2. It is simply not true that "no editor is ever known to confess ignorance or admit that he has been in the wrong." I have known many such "confessions."

3. "Peppery gossip!" Ah, if Mr. Savage could but know the "juicy morsels" that are *not* dispensed! It is a maxim of a certain successful newspaper publisher that "a good editor is known by what he will *not* publish." The scandals which are known to editors and never referred to in their newspapers are almost numberless. Hundreds of obscene or revolting telegrams go to the waste basket daily.

4. Judgment *is* a qualification of newspaper reporters. Were it not, every impression would bring a libel suit. What is keener in its way than the judgment of the trained reporter? He is a master of human nature.

5. It *is matter* if a sensational article turns out to be not true. It means discharge for the writer, and "explanations" to the party aggrieved.

6. I do not believe the "correspondents can practically make or unmake any public man's reputation." The truth will out.

7. I do not believe that any sober reporter ever wrote an entirely imaginative report of a sermon, and I am quite sure that if he did he lost his place within twenty-four hours.

If newspapers could be supported by passing a plate, we might reasonably demand a purer article. But they are sustained by the people, and the sheets which the masses love to read will prove profitable, "wax and grow fat," while those which are ahead or behind the age will die for lack of sustenance. This is the law. Ninety-nine papers out of one hundred are printed for gain. Expenses are enormous. The people expect the news, and if the "Tribune" gives it not, the "Tribune" will die. Theory never yet ran a daily journal. Many fortunes have been lost by men who thought otherwise, and expected to find the people standing in line with advertisements and subscription-money.

Mr. Savage's careless humor is due, no doubt, to ignorance. Too many ministers of the gospel, it is to be regretted, are wont to indulge in animadversion based upon a superficial knowledge of the subject discussed.

F. S. WOODBURY.

III.

MR. EDITOR: The answer by Rufus Hatch in the REVIEW for October to the question, "Ought our present National Banking System to be continued?" suggests a comparison, which I will make in the form of a story. Once upon a time, an enterprising "down-Easter" built a grist mill at the outlet of a small pond and for a few months did a satisfactory business, when of a sudden his mill stopped grinding. On investigating the cause of the stoppage, he found the pond drawn down. "A single danger menaced this system." In fact, without the pond he had no "system." He wisely concluded that it was of no use to try to continue the system when its distinguishing feature was non-existent. The distinguishing feature of our national banking system is

the national debt, the extinguishment of which will leave us, unless otherwise provided for, without a banking system.

Psalms upon the beauty of our system are pleasant enough, but in view of its early demise, suggestions for an inevitably necessary substitute would seem to be more in order just now.

JAMES N. CLARK.

IV.

MR. EDITOR: The objection of Mr. Field to Henry George's system of taxation is not well taken, and can be shown, by a little reflection, to be groundless. The necessary expenses of government, instead of the immense revenue equal to present economic rent, will be amply sufficient to ensure nationalization of land. The present value of land is forced, and is not the result of the uninterrupted growth of the community. As land is necessary to life, and its value has been constantly advancing, there is a demand for land beyond any other thing. The present system encourages this extraordinary desire, causing vast tracts to be withdrawn from use and advancing the price beyond all reason. The effect of a tax exclusively on land values would reduce its value at least in proportion to the tax. When the economic rent is five per cent. of the value, a tax of one per cent. would reduce the value one fifth, throwing lands held for an increase of price on the market, and causing unimproved lands close to the margin of cultivation to be abandoned, which must further reduce values and the area of taxable land, compelling a higher rate and a further reduction of value. The moment that land values are separated from improvements, and a tax put upon one that has been taken from the other, a great change will take place in public enterprise; the current of human desires will quicken as if some marvelous discovery had offered untold happiness to a people. Land values vanishing, the desire for rent would vanish with them. Improvements reappearing in infinite variety, wages would advance with advancing desire. The people, in a spirit of self-preservation, would regard land as the instrument for the collection of taxes, instead of a patent of nobility, and the demand for it would cease.

HENRY RAWIE.

V.

MR. EDITOR: To make his figures prove that Christianity is on the increase, Dr. Parkhurst should show that every attendant at a Christian house of worship is a believer, and that considerations of fashion, society, personal credit, popularity, curiosity, etc., have nothing whatever to do with pew-holding, the contributing of money to, or attendance on, the churches. Then he should supplement this proof with statements showing that infidel, agnostic, and materialistic publications are on the decrease; that all dubitation as to the tenets of Christianity is disappearing from the literature of the day; that that dubitation appears no longer in popular conversation; and that crimes, defalcations, and immoralities, and all those offenses against which Christianity warns, are surely and substantially decreasing. Then he will be able to prove by figures the fact he so earnestly hopes to make us believe.

JOHN W. BELL.

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